ROUMANIA AND THE GREAT WAR

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R. W. SETON-WATSON

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IN PREPARATION

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS AND THE NEW EUROPE.

ROUMANIA AND THE GREAT WAR

BY

R. W. SETON-WATSON D.LITT.



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In this essay—which is partly based on a lecture delivered to the Royal Scottish Geographical Society last February—I have merely attempted to give the salient features of Roumanian history and to provide a brief estimate of Roumanian policy in relation to the Great War. In the appendices I have endeavoured to provide the reader with the statistics upon which must necessarily rest any estimate of the probable frontier between Roumania and Hungary, and between Roumania and Serbia, after the war.

R. W. S. W.

30th April, 1915.

LIST OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I. OUTLINE OF ROUMANIAN HISTORY 1

II. THE ROUMANIANS OF HUNGARY 34

III. ROUMANIAN MINORITIES IN RUSSIA AND THE BALKANS . . 57

IV. ROUMANIAN POLICY AND THE WAR 61

APPENDICES

I. THE ROUMANIAN COUNTIES OF HUNGARY (1910) 73

II. THE ROUMANIANS OF HUNGARY—RELIGION AND NATIONALITY 75

III. RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SEVEN COUNTIES ON THE MAGYAR-ROUMANIAN LINGUISTIC FRONTIER . . . 77

IV. SUMMARY—DITTO AFTER SUBTRACTING THE PURELY NON-ROUMANIAN DISTRICTS 83

V. RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE MIXED DISTRICTS OF THE SAME SEVEN COUNTIES 84

VI. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS TABLES 88

VII. ROUMANIAN UNITY AND RACIAL MINORITIES 90

VIII. THE SZEKEL AND SAXON MINORITIES 94

IX. THE NEW FRONTIER AND A JUST SETTLEMENT . . . 95

BIBLIOGRAPHY 98

ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAP . . . . . *Facing* 100

INDEX 101

ROUMANIA AND THE GREAT WAR

I.

THERE is a popular proverb which says, "The Roumanian never dies" (Romanul nu pere). Its truth has been established by the astonishing vitality displayed by the Roumanian race during sixteen centuries, and no more suitable motto can be found for any discussion of Roumanian history and politics at the present day.

At a time like the present our attitude towards any of the neutral countries of Europe almost inevitably takes on a certain tinge from the great events of the war, and is apt to be determined by the decisive question, Is it for the Entente or is it for the Dual Alliance? The fact that, in the case of Roumania, the answer to this question should still be doubtful is very largely due to neglect. Roumania is a country which British public opinion has steadily, almost systematically, ignored, sometimes for purely accidental reasons, sometimes for other reasons to which I hope to draw attention later. Yet Roumania does not deserve the indifference with which she has been treated.

It is not as generally recognized as it should be, that thirteen out of the twenty independent States of Europe have a smaller population than Roumania, that her territory greatly exceeds in area every other Balkan State, as well as the kingdoms of Belgium, Holland and Denmark, and the republics of Switzerland and Portugal; that the Roumanian race in the present kingdom and its neighbouring countries already numbers between twelve and thirteen millions; that the Roumanian army takes rank immediately after those of the six Great Powers; and that her trade almost equals in volume the combined trade of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece. This bare statement should suffice to prove that Roumania must be regarded as an important factor in the European situation. Without some knowledge of Roumania and her policy, it is impossible to understand the Near East, and it is becoming increasingly obvious that her attitude will have a very great influence, perhaps a decisive influence, upon any settlement in the Balkan Peninsula. A hundred years ago Roumania consisted of two corrupt and backward vassal provinces of Turkey, without influence or consideration in the world. To-day she has been not unjustly described as "the Belgium of the East," progressing by leaps and bounds. Surely it is worth studying the causes of this remarkable transformation, the main factors to which Roumania owes her independence and present prosperity, and the chief problems which have determined

her policy in the immediate past and are likely to influence it in the near future.

At the outset it is necessary to emphasize Roumania's peculiar geographical position. In the first place, she is the guardian of the mouths of the Danube, the greatest river of Central Europe—a river of still unrealized and undeveloped possibilities. Next she is the sentinel of Latin culture in the east of Europe, a racial link with Italy and France amid a world of alien peoples. Above all, she is the third in the chain of non-Slavonic races which stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea and keeps the two main Slavonic groups apart. Lying like a pair of saddlebags round the Carpathian mountains, she is a country of striking contrasts of scenery. The wild forests and upland valleys of the Transylvanian frontier give place, further south and east, to the wide and fertile plains of the lower Danube and its tributaries. As one of the great wheat granaries of Europe, and as the possessor of extensive oilfields, Roumania is likely to play a very prominent part in providing the belligerents with some of the sinews of war during the next six months.

The country which we now know as Roumania was for several centuries sandwiched between three Great Powers—Russia, Austria and Turkey. Then, as the Turkish tide receded, in other words, as Turkey ceased to count as a Great Power, Roumania remained, so to speak, suspended in the air as the finger on the balance between Russia and Austria,

and inevitably oscillating from one to the other. The history of the last two centuries, so far as the Balkan Peninsula is concerned, is the history of Austro-Russian rivalry. This is especially marked if we consider the development of Serbia, and of the movement for Southern Slav unity which has reached its crisis in the present war. But it is equally clear in the case of Roumania.

Her peculiar position of geographical detachment was accentuated by her detachment in the matter of language, by the lack of any close language ties with any of the neighbouring races. All this very naturally encouraged a feeling of aloofness, a tendency to resent being called a *Balkan* State. This is a pose which has had its good and its bad sides, and which indeed is true or false very much according to the way in which it is applied. But no serious student of history can accept this pose, and it is a satisfactory sign of the times that the most distinguished historian of modern Roumania, Professor Jorga, is devoting much of his energy to making Bucarest a centre of Balkan historical studies, and is never tired of emphasizing the solidarity of Roumania and the other Balkan States. He is perfectly justified in arguing that the Roumanian element has always been one of the chief "cultural" elements in the history of the Peninsula, and that history and geography have combined to assure to Roumania a still more prominent rôle in the future.

As in our own case, geography is the dominant

factor in determining Roumanian policy, but ethnography plays a scarcely less important part. This is best shown by the following table, which gives in round figures the distribution of the Roumanian race :—

A. The present kingdom (total population, 7,500,000)	7,000,000
B. Hungary (including Transylvania)	3,500,000
C. Austria (Bukovina)	230,000
D. Russia (Bessarabia)	1,350,000
E. Serbia (Timok District)	200,000
F. The Coutzo-Vlachs (or Aromani) of the Balkans	350,000
	12,630,000

Allowing, then, for statistical vagaries in those countries where the Roumanian element is regarded with disfavour, we are entitled to speak of a race of thirteen millions, and are faced by the fact that even on the most moderate estimate the Roumanians are numerically the strongest race of the whole Balkan and Danubian systems. Even if as a result of this war the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) should attain to national unity, they would still only number eleven millions. The Magyars, despite the most desperate statistical efforts, cannot claim more than between eight and nine millions, and quite apart from the fact that that number includes many renegades who may ere long revert to their former racial allegiance,

it is obvious that an independent Hungary, if erected on racial lines, would not include more than seven million Magyars. The Bulgarians, even if they acquired every inch of territory which they claim as Bulgarian, would not exceed five or six millions. The Greeks, even if they succeeded in uniting their entire race in Europe and in Asia, would still be less than seven millions even according to the most liberal estimate. The Czechs and Slovaks, if they could form an independent State, would not greatly exceed nine millions. The Albanians, so far as their number can be estimated at all, are only about a million strong. It will thus be seen that of all the races which lie to the southward of the great racial blocks of Germans, Poles and Russians, the Roumanians are unquestionably the strongest.

Of this total of thirteen millions, one-third is still unredeemed, yet only the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary and of Russia can be seriously reckoned as part of "Romania Irredenta." Obvious reasons of geography make their kinsmen of Greece and Serbia unredeemable. The situation of the Roumanians of Transylvania will be dealt with in detail later, but at the very outset it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Roumanian question, like the Southern Slav question, can only be understood when treated as a complete whole and not as a number of watertight compartments unconnected with each other.

The origin of the Roumanian race has formed

the subject of much speculation and heated discussion. A purely academic question has been distorted to serve the purpose of rival parties and to prove or disprove the claims of racial supremacy. Certain points cannot, and never will be, cleared up for lack of evidence, but the main lines are absolutely clear and no amount of political special pleading can succeed in distorting them. The modern Roumanians are the descendants of those Roman colonists whom Trajan planted for the defence of the empire against the northern barbarians. After the first conquest, which has been immortalized in the reliefs of Trajan's Column at Rome, Dacia rapidly became a flourishing province, and included the greater part of the modern Roumanian kingdom and of Transylvania—its chief town, Apulum, being in the latter (now Karlsburg or Gyulafehérvár).[1]

In the year 270 the colony was abandoned by the Emperor Aurelian, and for a thousand years this whole tract of country has nothing which can be even remotely described as history. It can boast an almost unique record of anarchy and chaos, with practically no memorials of either literature, architecture or art. The whole period is shrouded in impenetrable obscurity, and it is not till the thirteenth century that the veil is lifted. By that time we find the country racially what it is to-day—Roumanian. This fact is not disputed; but there are two rival explanations each worked out on the

[1] Perhaps best known under its mediæval name of Alba Julia or Alba Regia.

ground of a political thesis. The one view is that the native population preserved its identity virtually unimpaired through a thousand years of invasion and disturbance; the other that the population was withdrawn to the south of the Danube, remained there for a thousand years, and only began to return in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By putting forward this latter theory, Magyar controversialists have established to their own satisfaction, but certainly not to that of any external observer, the right of one race which has been nine or ten centuries in a country to destroy the national identity of another race which has only been seven centuries in the same place. As usual, the truth is to be found halfway between the two rival theories. The Roumanians are unquestionably descended from the Roman colonists of Dacia. Their Latin origin is obvious to anyone who walks through the streets of Bucarest; still more to anyone who visits the remoter villages of Transylvania and sees the pure Roman types among the peasantry. Above all, the Roumanian language is an unanswerable proof of linguistic continuity, its grammar and syntax being predominantly Latin. On the other hand there is a considerable admixture of Slavonic words in the vocabulary such as clearly proves the presence of other elements in the race.

Perhaps the best proof that the Roumanian tide did not set from south to north as Magyar apologists argue, but from north to south, is supplied by the position of the various capitals. In Wallachia,

the original centres were Campulung and Curtea de Arges, which were superseded first by Targovistea and finally by Bucarest, while the capital of Moldavia was transferred from its original seat in Suceava (in what is now Bukovina) to Jassy. In each case it is a gradual descent from the northern mountains into the plains of the Danubian system.

In the Middle Ages the Daco-Romans, as it is now the fashion to call them, were virtually submerged. The Macedo-Romans—to-day known as the Coutzo-Vlachs or, in their own dialect, the Aromani—played a more important part. The revived Bulgarian Empire of the thirteenth century is more correctly described as a Bulgaro-Vlach or Bulgaro-Rouman State, and the founder of its dynasty, John Asen, was a Vlach. The modern Vlachs of the Pindus range are the survivors of another little-known but not unimportant mediæval State, which under the name of Great Blachia or Vlachia (Μεγαλα Βλαχια) comprised for a time the greater part of Thessaly to no great distance from Salonica.

It would be unnecessary for our present purpose to dwell further upon this extremely obscure period of history. Suffice it to say that by the thirteenth century the kernel of modern Roumania is forming in the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; 1290 and 1349 are the dates usually assigned for their emergence as national States. The whole territory lying east and north-east of the Iron Gates consisted of a number of loosely-

knit voivodes or principalities—each owning a varying and ill-defined allegiance to the Hungarian Crown, and living a precarious existence between the second Bulgarian Empire now tottering to its fall and the rising kingdom of Hungary. By the reign of Louis the Great (1340–1382), the northern voivodes had been assimilated by the Magyar nobility, while the sister States of Wallachia and Moldavia had taken definite shape between the Carpathians, the Dnjester and the Danube. But, unhappily before consolidation could be achieved, the Turks had made their first appearance upon the scene, and the greater part of five centuries were to be consumed in a struggle for existence such as rendered progress or culture well-nigh impossible.

The part played by the Roumanians in the defence of Europe against the Turks has not received sufficient recognition in the west. To their race belonged the famous hero John Hunyady, who led the armies of Hungary to repeated victory, and whose son, Matthias Corvinus, occupied the Hungarian throne during the period of furthest Magyar expansion. Nor should we pass over the exploits of another Roumanian hero who ascended the throne of Moldavia within a year of the great Hunyady's death. For almost half a century (1457–1504) Stephen the Great held the Turks at bay, and amply earned a place with Hunyady, Sobieski and Eugene as one of the four chief bulwarks of Christendom. "The high deeds which thou hast accomplished," wrote Pope

Sixtus IV. to Stephen, "against the infidel Turks, our common enemies . . . have rendered thy name so glorious that all, of one accord, sing thy praises." Yet his name has suffered from an unmerited neglect. Modern Chauvinist writers may wrangle over the respective claims of the German, the Magyar and the Slav to pose as the champion of the Cross against the Crescent, but the impartial historian will assign to each a share in the glorious result, and will add a special niche in the Temple of Fame for the Roumanian. Those who talk so glibly of Balkan savagery should never forget that the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Roumanians, each in their own degree, endured five centuries of national extinction, that Western Europe might pursue undisturbed her task of civilization.

The death of Stephen the Great ushers in a period of steady decline from warlike independence to abject vassalage. Yet the Principalities, as Wallachia and Moldavia came to be called, never succumbed to Turkish rule with the same completeness as Serbia and Bulgaria, or even as Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Instead of imposing Turkish pashas, the Sultan had been content with exacting a heavy tribute as the recognition of his suzerainty. While in Serbia the native aristocracy was exterminated, and in Bosnia adopted the faith of Islam as a means of saving its lands, the Roumanian boyars remained well-nigh undisturbed, and the native princes continued to be elected by the joint influence

of the boyars and the higher Orthodox clergy. The nation was enslaved and neglected, but never annihilated like its neighbours. Indeed we are confronted by the strange paradox that at the very moment when Buda was the capital of a Turkish pasha, a Roumanian prince, Michael the Brave, laid for a brief space of time the foundations of a "Greater Roumania," comprising Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Transylvania and Bukovina (to use the nomenclature of our own century, ere long, we hope, to be dismissed to the historical lumber room), and till his death in 1601 held Turks, Magyars, Poles, and his own rebellious subjects alike at bay. His exploits not unnaturally fired the imagination of the race, and to-day his statue in Bucarest is to Roumania what Nelson's Column, in Trafalgar Square, is to London—the scene of political and, above all, of patriotic demonstrations.

But Michael's reign was, in the words of Roumania's latest historian, nothing more than "a brilliant intermezzo." During the seventeenth century the two principalities lay between the upper and the nether millstone, and their degenerate rulers became the victims of Turkish, Austrian and Polish rivalry. In 1716 even the election of native princes, powerless phantoms as they were, was ignominiously forbidden by the Porte, and for the next century the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia were shamelessly put up for auction to the highest bidder. The Phanariot princes, to whom more than one distinguished family of

modern Roumania traces its origin, were for the most part rich Greeks resident in that quarter of Stambul which took its name from the great 'phanar' or lighthouse. There was no lack of competition for an office which, however lucrative, was precarious and indeed not without its dangers, and, as on the one hand almost all the successful candidates sought to recover, by means of rapacious exactions from their new subjects, the money spent in bribing the Porte, and, as on the other hand the Porte found an obvious interest in satisfying a new bidder, there were continual changes of ruler, and between the years 1716 and 1821 no fewer than thirty-seven and thirty-three Hospodars occupied the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia respectively.

The outward and visible signs of this shameful period in a slumbering nation's history was the transference, at the hands of the Turkish suzerain, of two Roumanian provinces to alien rule—Bukovina to Austria in 1775, and Bessarabia to Russia in 1812. It is but just to point out that the Hospodar of Moldavia, Gregory Ghika, vigorously protested against this surrender of Bukovina, and with it of the ancient capital of Moldavia, Suceava, but even his threats of alliance with Russia failed to alarm the Porte, who knew only too well its vassal's impotence. At that period, moreover, Russia and Austria were marching hand in hand, and the latter's acquisition of Bukovina, following upon the first partition of Poland, filled only a small

place in Joseph II.'s ambitious designs for a partition of the Sultan's dominions, by which he himself should obtain Belgrade and the Danubian provinces (in addition to the Dalmatian coastline, then in Venetian hands), while Crimea and Bessarabia should fall to Russia and the remnants of Turkey should be guaranteed by the Great Powers. The war of 1789, with its crowning incident, the capture of Belgrade by Loudon, seemed to be the forerunner of such a partition, but the death of Joseph II. and the outbreak of the revolutionary wars soon put an end to all idea of Austria's expansion to the Black Sea. Indeed, so far from being free to acquire fresh provinces, Austria ere long found her own existence at stake, and in 1809, as the result of Napoleon's victorious campaigns, had to submit, in common with her future rival Prussia, to a serious curtailment of territory and even to exclusion from the Adriatic. The influence of Napoleon throughout the Balkan Peninsula was, as everywhere else in Europe, that of an awakener, but the immediate result of the Napoleonic era was disastrous to the Danubian principalities. While endeavouring to exploit Polish national feeling for his own ends, Napoleon treated Wallachia and Moldavia merely as a useful pawn in the game of setting Austria and Russia by the ears, and in 1812 the Tsar, whose army of occupation had governed the provinces for the past six years, received from Turkey as the price of evacuation the eastern portion of Moldavia, known as Bessarabia.

In the fifty years which preceded the Congress of Vienna, the principalities had been exposed to equal danger from Vienna and from Petrograd; in the nineteenth century the dominant factor which determined their fate still continued to be the rivalry of Austria and Russia for influence upon the Lower Danube. Each time that Russia went to war with the Turks she occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, both as an obvious milestone on the road of territorial advance, and as a convenient hostage to bargain with at the close of hostilities. In less than sixty years there were no fewer than five foreign occupations, four Russian and one Austrian. Thus the Tsar's troops held Jassy and Bucarest from 1806 to 1812, from 1828 to 1834, from 1848 to 1849, and from 1853 to 1854, their place being filled during the Crimean War by an Austrian army. The solitary advantage which accrued to the inhabitants was the *Règlement Organique*, a constitution which the Russians left behind them on their withdrawal in 1834, and which, inadequate as it was, at least showed some slight improvement upon its predecessors and contained the germ of future liberty.

This perpetual recurrence of foreign intervention not unnaturally gave a further impetus to reviving national feeling. Under the influence of the French Revolution the idea of nationality had made its entry, not only into Italy and Hungary, but also into the Balkans. The Serbs were the first Balkan

people to assert their liberty.[1] But in Roumania also a popular movement broke out in 1821 under the peasant leader, Tudor Vladimirescu, and though the insurrection proved abortive, it none the less ended the Phanariot *régime* and secured for the two principalities the right to elect their own rulers.

From 1821 till the outbreak of the Crimean War Russian influence was really all-powerful in the principalities, which continued as before under the ban of Austro-Russian rivalry. But it was neither in Petrograd nor in Vienna, but in Paris, that the young Roumanians of the early nineteenth century sought the training and inspiration necessary to regenerate their country. The French influence, which for good or for evil has done so much to mould modern Roumania, owes its origin to the Phanariot princes whose families, amid the barbarous atmosphere of Stambul, sought to link themselves with western culture by a study of the French language. This outward veneer of civilization followed them to their courts in Bucarest and Jassy. At first adopted as a mere social pose by the young and wealthy boyars, French ideas began to strike root among the small educated class, and, as the spirit of nationality raised its head, were fostered by a growing consciousness of the Latin origin of the race. All the young Roumanian patriots made Paris their headquarters, and fell under the influence of the French Liberals and of

[1] Incidentally it is worth pointing out that the movements for Greek, and later for Bulgarian, freedom were organised on Roumanian soil, Bucarest being the centre of the *emigrés*.

Mazzini and his school. The revolution of 1848—"a stray spark from Paris," as it has been called—failed by reason of the inexperience of its promoters, their lack of any practical programme and the apathy of the masses, in whose mind the land was the all-absorbing question. But it brought to the front the future makers of Roumania, men like Cogalniceanu, Bratianu, and Rosetti, and taught them the need for united effort.

The Russian armies, which in 1849 crushed Magyar resistance to the House of Habsburg, had no difficulty in restoring the *status quo* in Wallachia and Moldavia, and in imposing the Tsar's will upon the new Hospodars. Thus the *annus mirabilis*, as was only natural, did not leave the same impress upon the east as upon the west of Europe. The first vital change in the situation was caused by the Russian evacuation in 1854, rendered necessary by the attitude of the Western Powers in espousing the Turkish cause. No sooner had the Russians withdrawn than their place was taken by an Austrian army of occupation, which remained in possession until long after the close of the Crimean War. The Congress of Paris (1856), like its famous predecessor the Congress of Vienna and its successor the Congress of Berlin, showed but little consideration for the wishes of the peoples whose fate depended upon its decisions. One of its endeavours was to repress the growing movement in favour of union between the two principalities. Indeed it is not too much to say that each of the

Great Powers in turn—notably Great Britain, which in those days upheld as a dogma the integrity of the Ottoman Empire—ran counter to Roumanian aspirations, and assumed the attitude of a domineering schoolmaster rather than that of a powerful friend and mentor. Napoleon III. alone showed genuine sympathy and understanding for the Roumanian cause. When, in 1857, a secret Anglo-Austrian agreement led to a flagrant "cooking" of the elections in a sense hostile to the union, Napoleon compelled the Porte to declare them invalid, and in the same year his skilful diplomacy won over the vanquished Tsar to his own modified interpretation of the Eastern Question. The conference in Paris, which resulted from the meeting of the two emperors at Stuttgart, was the prelude to the birth of a new State in south-east Europe. The farce of separate legislatures, each electing its own prince, was still solemnly maintained, but a joint commission and a supreme court were instituted, and the paradoxical title of "the United Principalities" was conceded. Such an arrangement could only be provisional; the efforts of the Powers were of no avail to dam up the rising tide of popular feeling, and early in 1858 the two assemblies in Bucarest and Jassy elected almost simultaneously one and the same person as their prince. "We have," said Cogalniceanu, speaking in the name of Moldavia, "the same origin as our brothers (of Wallachia), the same name and language, the same faith and history, the same

institutions, laws and customs; we share the same hopes and fears; the same frontiers are placed under our care. In the past we have suffered the same griefs, and we now have to assure for ourselves the same future."

At first the new prince, Alexander Cuza, was exposed to grave danger of intervention, and was obliged to submit to a double investiture and to maintain two separate ministries, but the outbreak of war between Austria and Napoleon, by paralyzing all opposition from Vienna, considerably strengthened Cuza's position. In 1861 the Porte conceded the union of the two assemblies, and on 23rd December of that year the prince was able to address to his people a proclamation which culminated in the words, "the Roumanian nation is founded."

The eight years of Cuza's rule (1858–1866) were marked by many internal reforms—notably the sequestration of church lands; the foundation of the two Roumanian universities; the severance of the Church from the corrupt and numbing influence of the Greek Patriarchate; and the emancipation of the peasantry, if not from all, at any rate from the worst of their feudal grievances. But his virtues and his faults alike—on the one hand his genuine zeal for national progress, and on the other the scandals of his private life and his contempt for constitutional forms—aroused the antagonism of the great families who had hitherto enjoyed and were anxious to retain a monopoly of govern-

ment. The *coup d'état* of 1864 was an attempt on Cuza's part to follow in the footsteps of his patron Napoleon III.; but the prince, who owed his election precisely to the fact that he did not belong to what might be called the *papabili* families, lacked the prestige and endurance necessary to impose his will upon the country. Moreover, the liberal nature of his innovations was counterbalanced by the suspension of Press freedom—a measure all the more reactionary in a country where the Press was still in its first childhood. In short, he attempted to play at benevolent despotism tempered by universal suffrage, though he was fully conscious that the latter must be a mere farce among a population so unripe in political training. His wholesale imitation of French institutions and methods of government showed too little regard for the social and economic needs of his fellow-countrymen. It is not without reason that Professor Xenopol has described the Roumanian State as "the creation of France," but there can be no doubt that Cuza's overhaste led to a slavish reproduction of French ideas, without any real effort to winnow the good from the bad.

In February, 1866, the dissatisfaction reached a head; Cuza was forced to abdicate and to cross the frontier and disappeared completely from the scene. The vacant throne was somewhat hurriedly offered to the Count of Flanders—the father of our brave ally King Albert of Belgium—and on his refusal to accept a position which seemed so

precarious, the unanimous choice of the Roumanian Chamber fell upon Prince Charles, a younger son of the Catholic and South German branch of the House of Hohenzollern. Strangely enough, while King William of Prussia showed scruples in sanctioning his young kinsman's acceptance, his candidature was eagerly approved by the same Napoleon III. who four years later vetoed, with such disastrous effects, the candidature of Prince Charles's brother Leopold for the crown of Spain. "Accept," Bismarck had said to the hesitating prince, "it will at any rate be an agreeable souvenir for your old age." The support of France more than counterbalanced the disapproval of Austria, and for the second time within a decade all possibility of active interference from Vienna was frustrated by the outbreak of war, this time between Austria and Prussia. Prince Charles, in the disguise of a bespectacled commercial traveller, passed down the Danube on an Austrian river steamer, and was welcomed on Roumanian territory by the Liberal leader Jon Bratianu, whose active intervention in Paris had been one of the decisive factors in his selection. For many years the incident of his first entry supplied his enemies with a cheap gibe against "Bratianu's lackey."

The accession of Prince Charles may be regarded as the chief turning point in all Roumanian history. His long reign of forty-eight years has completely transformed Roumania from a corrupt and backward dependency of the Turks to much the

most powerful independent State in south-east Europe, and a very large share of the credit for this transformation falls to King Charles himself, alike as statesman, as soldier, and as organiser. At first hampered by the unfriendly attitude of the Powers, and by the strained resources of an undeveloped country, the new sovereign found it necessary on more than one occasion to submit to humiliating treatment from the Porte. For ten years his entire efforts were devoted to organising the Roumanian army on Prussian models, and to introducing order into the country's finances. It was to take twenty years before the chronic deficit disappeared: but a reform of the coinage, the sale of State lands and the creation of a tobacco monopoly paved the way for that brilliant financial revival which was to mark the opening years of the twentieth century. At the same time, under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in spite of many a scurrilous attack, Prince Charles consistently adhered to the principle of constitutional government. His natural sympathy with Bratianu and the Liberal party rendered him not a whit the less loyal in his support of their Conservative rivals when the Chamber brought them into power. Thus for a whole generation, while Serbia was the scene of repeated *coups d'état* and political scandals, while in Bulgaria, despite wonderful progress, the representative idea has always been ruthlessly subordinated to the will of the sovereign, while Turkey groaned under the Hamidian despotism

and Greece still waited for the statesman who was to free her from the ban of political anarchism, Roumania, alone of all the Balkan States, could boast of an uninterrupted constitutional development.

Among the many consequences of the war of 1870, France lost that position in the Near East which Prince Charles himself had once defined as "the pivot of the situation." The statesmen of the Republic, at first from cruel necessity but ere long from shortsighted indifference, did nothing to prevent the lapse of that influence which Napoleon III. had won for France upon the Lower Danube. Great Britain, whom popular ignorance and prejudice had committed to a blindly Turcophil and Russophobe policy, shared with more than one Great Power the inability to foresee Roumania's future importance. This refusal "to take Roumania seriously"—of which an eminent diplomat wrote to Mr. White, then British Agent in Bucarest—obscured the political vision of all the Powers and of Austria-Hungary among the number; nor could the statesmanlike if unconvincing views of Andrássy on the common interests of Magyar and Roumanian be translated into practice, so long as the Magyar Chauvinists held the three million Roumanians of Hungary in brutal political bondage. Thus Roumania had no choice but to revolve in the orbit of Russia, whose championship of the Slav peoples of the Balkan Peninsula involved her in a fresh war with Turkey.

Neutrality in such a case was impossible, and, though from the very first aware of Russia's designs upon Roumanian territory, Prince Charles and his advisers were placed before the alternative of submitting against their will to a Russian occupation or actively espousing the cause of the invaders, in the hope of sharing the spoils of victory. The unexpected resistance of Osman Pasha afforded the Roumanian army an opportunity of proving its discipline and its prowess, and by the unanimous verdict of military writers the battles round Plevna established its reputation as a military asset of primary importance for the future of the Balkans.

Unhappily, Roumania's eminent services were repaid by Russia with a shortsighted ingratitude which was to bring its own political revenge. Bessarabia, which had been re-united to Moldavia after the Crimean War, was now once more annexed by the Tsar, and, though by way of compensation Roumania was grudgingly allowed to occupy the Dobrudza—the district lying immediately to the south of the Delta of the Danube—its mixed population and its lack of any obvious natural frontier could not in any way atone for the loss of territory which had been Roumanian since time immemorial. Moreover, Russia exerted her influence to prevent the inclusion of the fortress of Silistria in the ceded territory, and thus rendered Roumania peculiarly vulnerable from the south. The attitude of the Great Powers excluded all hope of redress. Austria-Hungary had been bought off with Bosnia;

Germany was disinclined to risk the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier; France was indifferent; Britain, nettled at Roumania's gallant disturbance of the *status quo*. The threat addressed by Prince Gortchakov to his ally that, in the event of opposition, Roumania would be occupied and her army disarmed, was worthily answered by Prince Charles' declaration that his victorious soldiers might be annihilated, but never would be disarmed. But not all the courageous and able diplomacy of Bratianu and Cogalniceanu could stave off the inevitable submission, and the Chamber, while lodging a dignified protest against superior force, authorized the evacuation of Bessarabia. But it cannot be wondered at that Roumania, after such treatment, showed little inclination to submit to the dictates of the Powers in matters which concerned her vital interests.

In declaring war upon the Turks, Roumania had formally proclaimed her independence, but the Powers imposed such galling conditions as the price of recognition, that Cogalniceanu, the ablest Foreign Minister whom the country has yet known, declared that it would be better to go on paying tribute to the Turks than submit to such terms. Article XLIV. of the Congress of Berlin laid down that absolute freedom of worship should be introduced; that difference of religion should not serve as a political disqualification; and that all foreign subjects should be placed "on a footing of perfect equality." In theory the clause was quite

unexceptionable, but it was open to very conflicting interpretations, and, as interpreted by the Cabinets of Europe, it would have involved the sudden naturalization of 300,000 Jews and its inevitable consequence, their economic domination of the country.

The Jews have many just grievances in Roumania, and their status is very anomalous: for they are citizens of no-man's-land, not enjoying Roumanian citizenship, but having lost that of their country of origin. The law makes it impossible for them to own land, and precludes them from the exercise of certain trades. The former provision can be explained as the sole effective means of preventing large tracts of country passing into Jewish hands: but not even the predominance of the Jewish element in all the northern towns of Moldavia can justify the latter. It is, moreover, peculiarly galling that the Jews, though regarded as aliens and denied political rights, should be liable to military service—an arrangement which conflicts with all democratic and constitutional tradition and indeed with the most elementary ideas of give and take. On the other hand it must be admitted that some kind of restriction was inevitable to check the very serious economic dangers in which Jewish immigration had involved Roumania, and above all as an answer to the sinister agitation of international Jewish societies and financial interests against Roumania's very existence as an independent State.

The indignation kindled throughout Roumania by the interference of the Congress with her internal affairs placed the Government in a very difficult position, and not unnaturally found its expression in anti-Semitic outbreaks. After long delays the Chamber was induced to repeal the reactionary Clause 7 of the Constitution of 1866, by which Roumanian citizenship had been limited to Christians: but naturalization was made difficult for any foreigner by the provision which required the special sanction of a two-thirds majority in the Chamber for each individual case. This solution, unsatisfactory as it was, met with the grudging approval of the Powers: but Bismarck made recognition by Germany dependent upon the further condition that the Roumanian State should guarantee the interest upon the German capital invested in the railways. The hostility of Europe having at length been overcome, the last obstacle to Roumania's proclamation as a kingdom was removed, and on 22nd May, 1881, Prince Charles assumed the royal crown forged from Turkish cannon captured in the redoubts of Plevna.

The remaining thirty-three years of his reign were a period of peaceful consolidation, during which Roumania enjoyed a happy immunity from the scandals and crimes which brought her Balkan neighbours into notoriety. The problems which faced King Charles were utterly different from those which confronted the rulers of Serbia or Bulgaria. Unlike those countries, whose noble families were

exterminated by the Turks, Roumania has preserved a powerful aristocracy of her own—the so-called boyars, who represent the last survival in the Balkans of feudal landed proprietorship. This fact has its good and its bad side. On the one hand it has supplied a leisured class capable of guiding the political infancy of a backward country, and, what is perhaps more important in that part of the world, a recruiting ground for the diplomatic service. Indeed the Roumanians, aided by their natural gifts as a Latin race, have shown so marked a diplomatic superiority to all their neighbours as to rely, if anything, too much on diplomatic as opposed to other methods. On the other hand, the Roumanian upper class is disfigured by many obvious excrescences—men who devote their whole lives to pleasure and luxury, who speak French far better than Roumanian, and know far more of Monte Carlo and Paris than of their native country.

It would be absurd to deny that the agrarian problem is the weakest spot in Roumania's armour. The situation of the peasantry is still very unfavourable compared to that of Serbia or Bulgaria, where every peasant owns his own land and poverty is almost unknown. Moreover, it has led to more than one agrarian revolt, above all the very grave outbreak of 1907, which was put down by the military with quite undue severity. The events of that summer very seriously alarmed the Roumanian upper class, and not without reason, for during twenty-four hours it had seemed as though Bucarest

might fall into the hands of the peasantry. Since then certain reforms have been introduced—notably the extension of village banks and cheap popular credit, and the adoption of a limited scheme of land purchase. Such measures were, it is true, quite inadequate, but they represented the first step in the right direction, and the Liberal party, though by halting and timid steps, has come to commit itself definitely to a far-reaching policy of land purchase.

If agrarian problems in Roumania differ radically from those in other Balkan countries, this is equally true of the political system, and here again King Charles has left his own personal mark upon its development. Roumania possesses a regular system of party government, resembling in technique that of Great Britain more closely than that of any other Continental State. In marked contrast to Bulgaria, where each of the very numerous parties is a mere clique, labelled with the name of an individual minister, Roumania has been ruled alternately for the last half century by the two great parties, the Liberals and Conservatives. It may be added that these names are just about as much or as little of a misnomer as similar names in more Western countries. The chief fault of the Roumanian party system is that it is too obviously an arrangement of "Ins" and "Outs," under which most of the leading officials, including the prefects of departments, change with every change of Government. There has thus grown up a political "spoils"

system, which is rendered easier by the fact that the administration is based on French models. At the same time the franchise is narrow, complicated and superannuated. The existing curial system, under which the voters are divided into several distinct electoral colleges, gives an undue share of political power to the landed class. As a result there is a certain amount of electoral corruption, though in this respect Roumania is well nigh spotless compared to her neighbour Hungary, who has long held the record in Europe for the grossest possible political and electoral corruption. It should be added that on the very eve of the great war the Liberal Government in Roumania, which has for some years past stood committed to the principle of universal suffrage, was engaged in drafting an elaborate scheme of electoral and agrarian reform: but by general consent it was decided to postpone the labours of the Constituent Assembly until the return of more normal times.

In foreign policy, even more than in internal affairs, the personality of King Charles has been decisive. It has been the fashion to criticise him as a mere tool of Germany, but in reality it would be quite unjust to assert that he ever subordinated the interests of his adopted country to his personal sympathies with the land of his birth. At the opening of his reign, French influence was paramount in Roumania, and Charles himself, despite his German blood, had many intimate ties with

France. But after the disasters of 1870 France became almost a negligible quantity in the Near East, and the statesmen of the Republic, instead of attempting to maintain the traditional connection with Roumania, forced her by their neglect into other channels. By 1877, Russian influence had reached its zenith in Bucarest, and the Russo-Roumanian brotherhood-in-arms against the Turks ought to have inaugurated a close alliance. Unhappily, Russia's unwise policy after the war completely alienated Roumania. As a reward for her services she was stripped of the province of Bessarabia, which Russia had acquired by conquest from its Turkish suzerain in 1812, but had been compelled to restore in 1856 to its rightful owners, the Roumanians. Russia thus acquired a control over the lower reaches of the Danube as a first step towards establishing in Roumania that overlordship which she had won but was so soon to lose over Bulgaria. Since that date the Roumanians of Bessarabia—or the "Moldavians," as the Russian provincial authorities prefer to call them—have suffered from the same lack of political and linguistic rights as the other races of the empire, and their plight has been a permanent grievance to their kinsmen in the Kingdom of Roumania. The events of 1878 rankled in their minds; alienated and suspicious, the king and his leading statesmen gravitated more and more towards Germany and Austria. Meanwhile, Britain, after showing but little interest in the creation of Roumania, ignored

her politically during the critical years when she most stood in need of help and sympathy; allowed the great Jewish financiers to boycott her on the London Stock Exchange; showed no perception for her commercial possibilities, and thus naturally forced her to turn to Germany for expert opinion and for capital.

Thus for various reasons what are to-day the three Entente Powers lost all political influence in Roumania, which for a whole generation revolved in the orbit of Austria-Hungary. The intimacy of Austro-Roumanian relations survived the strain of a tariff war, and was not even shaken by the perpetual friction with Hungary which Magyar repression of the large Roumanian population evoked. For Roumania, as for Italy, a position of isolation was impossible; the country was faced by an inevitable choice between the Russian and Austrian spheres of influence. But in deciding for the latter, romantic sentiment played no part; the entente with Austria-Hungary was always a business proposition, never an alliance of hearts.[1] In recent years, before the Balkan wars transformed the situation, the relationship had become very curious, the Clericals of Vienna—notably the famous Dr. Lueger—combining with the Roumanians in anti-Magyar propaganda. In other words, Austria retained the Roumanians as her satellite by fanning their grievances against her own partner, while Hungary neutralized Roumanian intrigues in Tran-

[1] See Iorga, *Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes*, II, p. 370.

sylvania by tying the hands of the Roumanian Government and by periodical official pronouncements on the vital need for the co-operation of Magyar and Roumanian, as mere islets in the rising Slav ocean. Just as Italy became the ally of Austria in order to escape the inevitable alternative of deadly enmity, so Roumania attached herself to Austria-Hungary because she was not yet strong enough to assert the national claims of her kinsmen and thereby embroil herself with so powerful a neighbour.

Throughout this whole period King Charles kept foreign policy almost entirely in his own hands; indeed it would be no exaggeration to describe it as his own personal policy. Whether it always corresponded with the true interests of Roumania has long been a subject of hot debate, but it is at any rate incontestable that it was always honestly conceived in accordance with an estimate of those interests, as formed by a very wise, eminently sane and experienced diplomatist. At last, when Europe was overwhelmed by disaster, fate showed him the consideration which has been denied to his friend and neighbour, the venerable Francis Joseph, and released him by death from a cruel and equivocal position which was not of his making.

II.

JUST as an exclusive study of Serbia and Montenegro supplies no real clue to the history and present position of the Southern Slavs, so also even the briefest survey of Roumanian history would be utterly incomplete and misleading without reference to the Roumanians of Transylvania, and the part which they have played in the development of the race as a whole.

For centuries past the Roumanians have formed the great majority of the population of Transylvania.[1]

[1] Transylvania, it should be remembered, has always enjoyed a certain autonomy under the Hungarian Crown—at first under *vajvodes* or Governors of its own, of whose exact status details are not known. The Szekels probably first settled in Transylvania in the second half of the eleventh century (see Marczali, *Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte*, p. 28). The Saxons were invited as colonists by successive Hungarian kings, and their Golden Charter of privileges dates from the year 1224. In 1437 the three privileged "nations" (the Magyars, Szekels and Saxons) formed a joint league of defence against all comers, save the king himself. This league was renewed in 1459 and became in 1542 the real basis of the Transylvanian constitution (for which consult Schuler-Libloy, *Siebenbürgische Rechtsgeschichte*, 1868). After the conquest of Central Hungary by the Turks (1526–1540), Transylvania became a principality under native Magyar princes—notably the Zápolya's, the Rákóczy's and the Bethlens—owning the allegiance of the Hungarian Crown but paying tribute to the Sultan as their suzerain. In 1691, five years after the recovery of Buda from the Turks, Transylvania recognized the dominion of the House of Habsburg and continued to enjoy autonomy until the reign of Francis Joseph.

As we have seen, they themselves claim priority over all neighbouring races, while the Magyars with equal fervour have sought to prove that their own ancestors arrived at least four centuries earlier than the first Roumanians. This problem has long ceased to be purely academic, and to-day provides a battle cry for two rival political and racial schools. But in reality it is as superfluous as it would be difficult to provide an answer to so obscure an historical riddle. The fact that my ancestors settled in a country earlier than those of my nearest neighbour can never provide me with an excuse for treating him as an outcast or an inferior, and the very attempt to argue on such lines is the best proof of the mediæval and reactionary outlook of the modern Magyar. In the case of Transylvania, whatever may be disputed, one thing is indisputable —that the Roumanians have, from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century, occupied the position of mere serfs, and even since the abolition of feudalism in 1848 the position of political helots.

Transylvania, during its period of independent existence, provided the first striking instance of religious toleration in Europe, by establishing the four recognized religions of the principality—the Catholics, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, and the Unitarians—on a footing of absolute equality before the law (1571). But this seemingly ideal arrangement was subject to one fatal omission. Not a word was said of the fifth religion of the country—the Orthodox faith which was professed by that

despised and voiceless majority, the Roumanian serfs. The Diet, not content with ignoring, proceeded to persecute. A renegade priest was imposed upon the Orthodox Roumanians as a Calvinist "superintendent" (1556); the Orthodox bishops were prevented from visiting their dioceses (1588); and the clergy of Moldavia and Wallachia were strictly forbidden to enter Transylvania (1600).

The only sympathy and interest shown towards the unhappy Roumanians came from the Emperor himself. Originating with Leopold I. in a passion for successful proselytism, it became under his successors a genuine, if often ineffectual, tradition, enduring through two centuries and finding its final and most tragic expression in the person of the late Archduke. Leopold's pious efforts brought into being the Roumanian Uniate Church, which has played so great a part in the subsequent development of the race. The new church retained its married clergy and vernacular rite, but accepted the Papal Supremacy, Purgatory and the "Filioque" clause of the Creed. In return for this, the Uniate clergy escaped from the ignominious serfdom in which they had hitherto been held, and were placed on an equal footing with the Catholic clergy. Even these scanty concessions evoked lively protests from the Transylvanian Diet, which described the Roumanian people as "not attached to religion, but merely full of superstition," as "barbarous and prone to every misdeed." *Nec jugi patiens nec libertatis capax*—such has been the highly

convenient dogma upheld even up to the present day by the Magyar ruling class in its dealing with the Roumanians.

In Ioan Inocentiu Micu (or Klein) the new church soon produced a zealous champion of the whole race without distinction of religion, but his endeavour to secure political rights for the Roumanians by placing them on a par with the three recognized "nations" (the Magyars, Saxons and Szekels) of Transylvania, shattered against the determined hostility of the privileged classes, and Micu himself, deprived of his episcopal office, had to withdraw to the shelter of the Roman Curia.

The lively interest shown by Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II., in the Roumanian people, so far from remedying their unhappy lot, kindled in them vain hopes which only too soon brought disillusionment in their train. Economic and national causes contributed almost equally to provoke the bloody peasant rising of 1784–5, which deluged western Transylvania in blood and was suppressed with extraordinary brutality by the Magyar nobles. As their forerunner Dózsa, in the sixteenth century, was tortured on a molten throne, so now the peasant leaders Horia and Closca were broken on the wheel. What distinguished the movement from similar peasant risings in other parts of Europe was the open expression of national feeling in many of the demands put forward. Magyar political supremacy

was to be abolished; Roumanian or German officials were to be appointed for the Roumanian population. The revolt was quelled, and even before Joseph's death all the agrarian reforms by which he had sought to alleviate the peasant's lot had already been revoked. "The nature of this lawless nation," argued the oppressors, "is such that it can only be ruled by terror." But though this maxim was only too faithfully carried out, that stubborn vitality which has so repeatedly baffled Magyar aggression, led the Roumanians, only a few years later, to reassert their national claims, and this time in a more precise and legal form. The memorial which they published under the title of "Supplex Libellus Valachorum," marks an epoch in Roumanian history. Not merely that it reasserts that old trust in the person of the Emperor which was still to survive so many disillusionments, and that it identifies the Roumanian cause in Transylvania with the claims of democratic progress; it is also remarkable as sealing that co-operation of the two Roumanian churches, the Orthodox and the Uniate, without which no real progress could have been achieved. Just as the Libellus represents the joint initiative of the Orthodox and Uniate episcopate, so on every subsequent occasion of political importance they have shown a striking example of mutual tolerance and goodwill. Indeed, the fact that it is possible for the two rival Metropolitans with their higher clergy to take part in a joint procession in full

canonicals augurs well for the future of the united Roumanian race.

The period which preceded and followed this ineffectual manifesto is marked by a literary revival which, however imperfect if judged on purely æsthetic grounds, was to have highly important political consequences. Three clerics of the Uniate Church—Samuel Micu, Şincai and Peter Maior—devoted themselves to a study of the origins of the race, and their historical writings are mainly responsible for reviving a consciousness of their Latin ancestry among the rising generation of Roumanians in the two principalities. Şincai's chronicle began to appear in print in the year 1808 (in Budapest); but the Magyar authorities promptly prevented its further publication, on the ground that its contents were worthy of the flames and their author of the scaffold (*opus igne, auctor patibulo dignus*).[1] The book remained in manuscript for another generation, but the ideas of Şincai and Maior permeated the little group of pupils whose task it was to prepare the intellectual and political regeneration of the principalities. The part played by Transylvania in the national awakening and in the creation of modern Roumanian literature can hardly be exaggerated.

In Transylvania the first four decades of the nineteenth century were a period of utter stagnation,

[1] The first volume was not actually published till 1843 in Jassy, and the completed work in 1853, but the MS. had already been consulted by numerous students, and had done its work.

and it was not till the great year of revolution that the Roumanians, under Magyar pressure, once more asserted their national claims. In April, 1848, the Hungarian Diet, sitting at Pressburg, voted the annexation of Transylvania to Hungary, though, of course, the matter lay entirely outside its competence; and at the end of May the Diet of Transylvania, "packed" for the purpose and intimidated by the ravings of a fanatical mob, ratified this more than questionable "union." The Magyars were, of course, enthusiastic, the Saxons anxious and suspicious, while the Roumanians openly protested with the utmost vigour at their command. While Kossuth was declaiming in favour of a Magyar national State and against the perfidy of Vienna, 40,000 Roumanian peasants assembled on the Field of Liberty at Blaj (Blasendorf) in Transylvania, to proclaim their loyalty to the Imperial House and to demand that political recognition and those linguistic rights which their Magyar neighbours so eagerly monopolized. Even in that eventful year it is difficult to find a more dramatic contrast. The Magyars unquestionably stood for historic development and constitutional rights, but they also stood for racial hegemony, for the forcible assimilation of all the other races, for an unitary Magyar State instead of the old polyglot Hungary. They thus drove all the other races to coalesce with the dynasty and the forces of reaction. The result was a violent racial war, with all kinds of

excesses on both sides. Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Saxons, all fought against the Magyars, and finally the scale was turned by the Russian troops which poured across the Carpathians in the name of outraged autocracy.

Strange as it may seem to those whose knowledge of history is limited to catchwords, it is no exaggeration to assert that " the defeat of Kossuth's Magyars, in the eyes of Europe martyrs of liberty, was greeted by their subject races as the end of a detested tyranny." [1] In the years of reaction which followed the suppression of the revolutionary movement, the Roumanians, like the other non-Magyar races of Hungary, received as reward what the Magyars received as punishment. When, as a result of the disastrous Italian war, constitutional government was partially restored to Hungary, the Transylvanian Diet also began to meet again, and in 1863, under the direct influence of Vienna, passed laws placing the Roumanian nation on a footing of equality with the three recognized " nations," and securing for it definite linguistic privileges. But hardly had the cup of liberty been placed to their lips than it was ruthlessly dashed away again. The change of *régime* which followed Austria's defeat at Königgrätz left the Magyars supreme arbiters of the fate of every race in Hungary, and the laws which had secured tardy justice to the Roumanians were treated as an unconstitutional interlude. The

[1] Auerbach, *Les Nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*, p. 239.

union of Transylvania with Hungary had already been voted by the Diet of Klausenburg, the vigorous protests of both Saxons and Roumanians against its hurried and questionable methods being, of course, entirely disregarded (September, 1865), and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 was followed by a further act of the Hungarian Parliament, regulating the details of this union.

One thing alone was left to the Roumanians from the brief interlude of political liberty which the era of constitutional experiment (known in Austrian history as the "Provisorium") had brought them. In the early 'sixties the Emperor had decreed the separation of the Orthodox Roumanians from the body of the Serb Orthodox Church, and their erection into a distinct national church, with its own Metropolitan in Hermannstadt (Sibiu), two suffragan bishops in Arad and Karansebes, and full control over its denominational schools. That these privileges of the Roumanian Orthodox Church did not share the fate of the political rights which they had so recently acquired was, above all, due to the high consideration in which the Emperor held Archbishop Şaguna.

This remarkable man, who will live in history as one of the true founders of the new Roumania, was able to secure from Francis Joseph and his advisers a guarantee of church autonomy (Act IX., 1867, of the Hungarian Parliament). The constitution which Şaguna's efforts secured for the Roumanian Orthodox Church deserves the attention of all

ecclesiastical students; for it bears many traces of contact with the surrounding Calvinism and is a very remarkable blend of the episcopal and presbyterian systems, combining as it does a hierarchy holding office for life with a complete scheme of lay control.

Since the Compromise of 1867 Transylvania has ceased to exist as a separate entity, and the Roumanians, like all the other races of the country, have been subjected to the rule of the Magyar oligarchy, unrestrained by any control from Vienna. The constitutional *régime* in Hungary has been no better than a whited sepulchre. It may be summed up as a crude and hasty attempt to transform the old polyglot Hungary—in which the nobility, or ruling class, was never purely Magyar but recruited from all the various races, and in which the language of State and of justice and administration was not Magyar but Latin—into a new Magyar national State of the narrowest type. It is this unreasoning devotion to an impossible Magyar State-idea (a Magyar állam eszme), the fanatical resolve to create a "Magyar Imperium," in which the Magyar should not be *primus inter pares* but a solitary image in the temple of Moloch, that has created a permanent fever in the body politic, and now threatens the very existence of the Monarchy as a whole. The rise of the German and Italian national States was in every way a natural growth, an union of fragments which obviously belonged together. The creation of a

Magyar national State by forcible assimilation would be a monstrous crime against nature, an attempt to fight the stars in their courses.

Deák and Eötvös, the great statesmen who inspired the settlement of 1867, were genuinely disposed to treat the non-Magyar races with generosity and tolerance, and to leave to a natural process that eventual Magyarization which they no less than the extremists regarded as the ideal solution. They held that a policy of mildness and concession would prove more efficacious than restrictive measures, and that Magyar culture could only hope to conquer in virtue of its innate superiority and moral force. It was on these grounds that, while refusing to recognize the nationalities as separate entities within the State, they designed a law guaranteeing the Equal Rights of the Nationalities (XLIV., 1868) on such liberal terms as should make it possible for every race to develop its own language and culture without let or hindrance. Unhappily, this famous law, which Magyar apologists have cited for over a generation as a crowning proof of Hungarian enlightenment and tolerance, remained from the very first a dead letter, and no sooner was the restraining influence of Deák and Eötvös removed than a long series of measures began to appear, which ran directly counter, not merely to the whole spirit but even to the letter of the original law. As early as 1870, when the judicial system of Hungary was reorganized, the linguistic rights conceded to

the nationalities in the law courts were entirely superseded. In matters of education the Slovaks were the first to suffer. In 1875 their three secondary schools and their academy and museum were arbitrarily dissolved, and for a whole generation two million Slovaks have been deliberately deprived of all higher education. The brutal intolerance evidenced by such measures was made general by the new Education Law of 1879, which was essentially a scheme for the Magyarization of primary schools. Meanwhile the Electoral Law of 1874 was expressly designed with a view to reducing the political influence of the nationalities to a minimum. Special clauses were inserted, imposing a higher qualification for the vote in Transylvania than in Hungary proper, and differentiating between the towns, which are mainly Saxon and Magyar, and the country districts, which are predominantly Roumanian. As a result there has been in recent years an average in the Roumanian districts of one deputy to every 50–60,000 inhabitants, but among the Szekels (the Magyars of eastern Transylvania) of one in every 4–5,000! An elaborate system of gerrymandering still further depressed the scale against the Roumanians, and what the actual provisions of the law failed to achieve was made good by generous interpretation on the part of the local authorities. Corruption and violence of the most brutal kind were employed to prevent the nationalities from electing their national representatives;

and to such lengths was this system of "voting" carried that in 1892 it was possible for a Roumanian petition to the Crown to assert without exaggeration that a non-Magyar citizen "can only take part in the electoral campaign if he disregards his life and personal safety," and that the Hungarian elections "have well-nigh assumed the character of a civil war."

Saguna and the small group of Roumanian patriots around him were helpless to stem the tide of Magyar aggression; Vienna and the Emperor, from whom alone protection could be expected, had placed themselves whole-heartedly at the disposal of the deadliest enemies of the Roumanian race. A memorial was issued in 1872 from the Archbishop's printing press, vindicating the rights of the Roumanian nation and Transylvania's special position, but strongly urging the need for a friendly entente between Magyar and Roumanian; but this despairing appeal fell upon deaf ears. Saguna's admission of impotence—*flere possem, sed juvare non*, he quoted to his restive followers—led to the adoption of a mistaken policy of abstention on the part of the Roumanian leaders, with the result that for the last quarter of the nineteenth century the non-Magyar races (for similar tactics were pursued by the Slovaks, Serbs and Ruthenes) were virtually unrepresented in the Hungarian Parliament. But a tiny group of irreconcilables survived, and in 1881, on the initiative of the historian, George Baritiu, convoked a meeting of

one hundred and fifty Roumanian delegates at Hermannstadt for the purpose of drawing up a new political programme. In this all the linguistic and national claims of the Roumanians are reasserted, and demands are put forward for a loyal fulfilment of existing laws, for a revision of the Law of Nationalities, for State aid to Roumanian denominational schools, and for the appointment of Roumanian officials in the counties inhabited by the race. But the most controversial, and from the Magyar point of view the most obnoxious, point in the whole programme was the first clause, which voices in a brief sentence the demand for the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy. It is also significant of the democratic tendencies of the newly founded Roumanian National Party that a clause in favour of universal suffrage should have been inserted.

The Hermannstadt programme was from the first treated by the Magyars as an act of hostility to the State, and all open propaganda in its favour, whether at elections or in the Press, was pitilessly punished. Indeed, as has been well said, Hungarian law invented a new offence for which no parallel can be found on any statute book—the crime of *lèse-magyarisme*.

No single incident throws more light alike upon the uncompromising attitude of the Magyar ruling class and upon the obstinate endurance of the Roumanians than the notorious "Memorandum Trial" of 1894. In 1892 the committee of the

Roumanian National Party had petitioned the monarch in a memorandum, recounting their many national grievances, challenging the legality of the Transylvanian Act of Union, and reasserting the demand for autonomy, and when the Hungarian Cabinet barred the deputation's access to the throne, had published the memorandum in pamphlet form. So masterly a document could not fail to produce an effect abroad, and the Hungarian Government, in its anger, brought the entire committee to trial on a charge of "incitement against the Magyar nationality." The Chauvinist jury before which the case was tried imposed terms of imprisonment amounting to a total of twenty-nine years. Dr. Ratziu, the party president, declined to recognize the court's jurisdiction, and appealed to the public opinion of the civilized world. "We have acted," they declared, "solely as mandatories of the Roumanian people, and an entire people cannot be brought to justice. . . . . You have yourselves realized that it is not a question of law but merely of force, and the world will learn with astonishment that a court has been found to judge men who were deprived of the possibility of having defenders. . . . . By your spirit of mediæval intolerance, by a racial fanaticism which has not its equal in Europe, you will, if you condemn us, simply succeed in proving to the world that the Magyars are a discordant note in the concert of European nations." A month after the trial the Hungarian Government eclipsed its

previous record by formally dissolving the Roumanian National Party as a disloyal institution.

Needless to say, the Memorandum trial and the plentiful crop of Press persecutions which preceded and followed it only served to embitter the Roumanians still further, and roused them to a fuller sense of solidarity with their kinsmen across the southern frontier. From the early 'nineties dates the foundation of the famous "League for the Cultural Unity of all Roumanians," which has been so furiously denounced by the Magyars and which has never failed to repay their attacks with interest. The students of Bucarest naturally played a prominent part in these racial feuds, and on more than one occasion burnt the Hungarian tricolour before the statue of Michael the Brave. Their elaborate polemics with the rival student societies of Budapest and Klausenburg gave rise to another Roumanian *cause célèbre*, in which Aurel Popovici was condemned to four years' imprisonment for his share in their literary feud. Popovici withdrew to Bucarest without awaiting sentence, and at a later date became one of the intellectual leaders of the "Great Austrian" party, enjoying the unspoken but very definite approval of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand.[1]

The late 'nineties witnessed a still further growth of Chauvinist feeling among the Magyars, and the

[1] See his remarkable political essay on "The United States of Great Austria" (*Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich*, 1906).

nationalities, effectually shut out from all share in political life, were of necessity driven into the economic field. Starting almost at zero, the Roumanians, and a little later the Slovaks, concentrated upon the task of emancipating themselves from the thraldom of Jewish and Magyar finance. Local banks and co-operative societies sprang up in all directions, and as resources grew, those at the head of the movement developed a distinct policy of land purchase and loans on behalf of the Roumanian and Slovak peasantry. Their enemies have accused them of usury, but the fact is that their competition has very materially reduced the current rate of interest. While in northern Hungary the regeneration of the Slovak peasantry is aided by the influx of large savings from the emigrants in America, both there and in Transylvania the steady decay of the old Magyar "gentry" class has told mainly in favour of the non-Magyar elements. Despite every effort of the authorities, despite even the significant fact that in many counties Roumanian communes are forbidden to invest money in Roumanian banks, these institutions grow stronger and more numerous every year, and by a process similar to that which is noticeable among the Prussian Poles, are creating an increasing proprietary class hostile to Magyar political predominance. Though still backward in education, they can boast a rapidly growing class of "intelligents," voluntarily committed to an ultra-democratic programme and proud of their

close touch with the peasantry, whose deep-seated national consciousness they have done so much to develop still further. Here it is necessary to point out that the party's adoption of an ultra-democratic programme (including universal suffrage and agrarian reform) has deterred neither the episcopate nor the larger Roumanian proprietors from according it their active support. Indeed, several of its most prominent leaders—George Pop de Basesti, Theodore Mihalyi and Alexander Vaida de Voivode—are members of the landed class.

The scandalous elections conducted by Baron Bánffy in 1896, and the patriotic outbursts which accompanied the Millenary celebrations of the same year, fanned to white heat the racial animosities which the long *régime* of Coloman Tisza had deliberately fostered. But it was during the rule of the Hungarian Coalition (April, 1906, to December, 1909), and the shameful elections in which Count Khuen-Hedérváry restored its Liberal rivals to power (June, 1910), that Magyar Chauvinism celebrated its worst orgies. The nationalities, having abandoned their policy of abstention and formed a joint political organization, had succeeded in securing the election of twenty-five deputies. But their treatment by the parliamentary majority exceeded all bounds. Not merely were they met by a blunt refusal to recognize their existence as a parliamentary party, but their leaders were subjected to continual intimidation and persecution, some being sentenced to lengthy

terms of imprisonment, others hounded out of political life. Not merely were they repeatedly shouted down or insulted on the floor of the House, but they also had to face open menaces from the Ministerial bench.[1] Count Andrássy, as Minister of the Interior, defined his programme as follows :— "Kindness and justice towards the masses, but pitiless severity in the prosecution of the agitators," by which he meant their political leaders. Six months later he openly admitted the racial question in Hungary to be one of brute force, and declared that the aspirations of the nationalities, "being opposed to the wishes and interests of the Magyar nation," could only be attained by blood and revolution.[2] Equally uncompromising pronouncements in favour of a policy of Magyarization could be cited from the public utterances of every prominent Hungarian statesman of the last generation.[1] Their hostility to the nationalities found expression in a long array of Press actions, in the increased curtailment of political meetings, clubs and societies, in their attitude to emigration and to agrarian and economic problems; above all in the reactionary Education Acts of Count Apponyi (XXVI. and XXVII., 1907) and in the stillborn measure of electoral reform introduced by Count Andrássy in November, 1908. The former, based upon the false assumption that patriots can be

[1] For details see my *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*, pp. 182–191.

[2] See *Racial Problems in Hungary*, pp. 198–9.

created by Act of Parliament, and that language is the sole basis of nationality, is a flagrant violation of the Law of Nationalities and also of the legal autonomy of the churches, and aims openly at the Magyarization of the non-Magyar primary schools.[1] The latter was avowedly framed in such a manner as to prevent any noticeable increase of political influence on the part of the non-Magyar races; the increase in the number of the electors was counterbalanced by an elaborate system of plural voting. Indeed it would be difficult to imagine anything more remote from those principles of universal suffrage, the introduction of which the Coalition, on assuming office, had solemnly proclaimed as its foremost task.

The elections of 1910, which constituted an European record for wholesale corruption and violence, reduced the representatives of the nationalities from twenty-five to eight, of whom five are Roumanians. Though Press prosecutions have become far less frequent under the successors of the Coalition—Khuen-Hedérváry, Lukács and Tisza—the situation of the Roumanians has in every other respect been as intolerable as ever. Two causes have accentuated the latent discontent of many generations. On the one hand, the measure of electoral "reform," so arbitrarily rushed through the Hungarian Parliament by Count Tisza in 1913, rendered the Roumanians desperate, since its enforcement would have perpetuated the Magyar

[1] See details, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–233.

hegemony under a veiled form and set back the cause of true reform for at least a generation. As its necessary corollary, a redistribution of seats, has not yet passed through Parliament, the new law has remained a torso, and external events have prevented its being carried into effect. It is to be hoped that whatever may be the issue of the war, this dishonest measure will share the fate of its forerunner, the Andrássy Bill. On the other hand, the events of the Balkan wars have snapped the links which bound Roumania to the Dual Monarchy, and enormously strengthened the national consciousness and prestige of all the Balkan States in the eyes of their kinsmen to the north. The Irredentist idea, hitherto latent, began its work of leavening the mass, and the bomb outrage in Debreczen in February, 1914—an event unprecedented in Roumanian history—may be described as the first mutterings of the storm.[1] From a national point of view the great war has come several years too soon for the Roumanians

[1] The Magyar Government had secured from the Vatican the erection of a Magyar Uniate Bishopric at Hajdudorog and the transfer of many thousand Roumanian Uniates to the new diocese. This was openly intended as a fresh step in that policy of Magyarization which had been pushed to such lengths in the sister Uniate Church of the Hungarian Ruthenes. The resentment of the Roumanians was universal, and a lively agitation was set on foot, both in Transylvania and Roumania. An infernal machine was posted to the new bishop, and though he himself escaped, his vicar-general and several other persons were killed or mangled by the explosion. The criminals were never traced, but they are believed to be Roumanians from Bessarabia, infected by Russian Nihilist tendencies.

and the Southern Slavs, but its catastrophic course has already transformed their situation.

During the past decade the Roumanians, not without reason, had set all their hopes upon the person of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. His keen sympathy with the nationalities of Hungary and his firm resolve to secure justice for them alone enabled their leaders to restrain the impatience of the rank and file. The folly of organizing revolution, when the next heir to an old man of eighty-three was eagerly awaiting the opportunity of helping them, was obvious even to the least scrupulous or intelligent. But it cannot be emphasized too strongly that had Francis Ferdinand succeeded to the throne and then proved unequal to the task which his many admirers expected him to fulfil, the revulsion of feeling among large sections of the population would have produced a highly dangerous situation. He alone stood between us all and disaster, and many of us who had been fully conscious of his faults and limitations, and had yet regarded him as the man of destiny, were overwhelmed by the hideous news of Sarajevo as a sure presage of world-wide disaster. The late Archduke had the clearest possible views upon the racial question in Hungary, and had even committed to paper an elaborate scheme for the regeneration of Hungary and the monarchy as a whole. The one flaw was in his attitude to the Southern Slav question, which he dreamt of solving on Croat basis, without due regard for the Serb element; and

Nemesis, with the harsh fury of a Greek tragedy, delivered him into the hands of an irresponsible Serb assassin, whose vile deed the gallant Serbo-Croat nation is now expiating in all the horrors of internecine war.

For our present purpose it will suffice to point out that the murder of the Archduke has been to the Roumanians and Slovaks of Hungary an annihilating blow, and that in destroying their main prospect of effective help from *within* the monarchy it almost inevitably prepares the way for a transference of their allegiance to outward influences.

III.

I HAVE described the situation of the Roumanians in Hungary in considerable detail, not merely because they are by far the most numerous and important of the "unredeemed" sections of the race, but also because they have contributed so much to the common fund of the race, alike in politics, in literature, and in economic progress, and because their future is for the kingdom of Roumania a matter of life and death in a sense which cannot even remotely be applied to the Roumanians of Bessarabia and the Pindus. This truth was tersely expressed to me some six years ago by Mr. Take Jonescu, the distinguished Roumanian Conservative statesman. "If I thought," he said, "that the Roumanians of Transylvania could ever conceivably become Magyarized, I should give up politics altogether, for it would no longer be worth while for us Roumanians of the kingdom to go on living." That is a point of view which in those days was by no means universal, but which is to-day admitted as an axiom by every thinking Roumanian, and by every foreign observer who has seriously considered the problem.

The history of the Roumanians of Bessarabia presents an almost complete blank. Till 1812 the

province formed an integral portion of Moldavia, and was therefore subject to the same political and agrarian conditions. Under Russian rule only a section of the Bessarabian boyars have survived, and even of these many have become assimilated in the Russian aristocracy. But as a rule it is not the peasantry who have profited by the decline of the landed class. The part played in Moldavia by the Jew has been shared by him in Bessarabia with the Greek and the Armenian, who control a very considerable portion of the land. The Russian bureaucracy, true to its reactionary principles, has discouraged intercourse with free Roumania, and has done little or nothing to improve the conditions of the backward and illiterate Roumanian peasantry. The Roumanian language has, of course, not been tolerated in the few schools which are allowed to exist, the schoolmasters are either Russians or Russified "Moldavians,"[1] and the clergy receive their scanty education in the Russian seminary of Kišinev (Chișinau). During the revolutionary movement in Russia permission was granted to print Roumanian church books, though only with Cyrilline characters, and still more recently the "Moldavian" language has been allowed more latitude in the churches of

[1] Just as in the 'sixties the Austrian authorities in Dalmatia persisted in describing the Serbo-Croat language as "Dalmatian," just as in the 'eighties Baron Kállay, as administrator of Bosnia, officially ordered the same language to be referred to as "Bosnian," so to this day in the parlance of the Russian authorities in Bessarabia the Roumanian language masquerades as "Moldavian."

Bessarabia. There is no such national movement as in Transylvania, and Bessarabia's contribution to the stream of Roumanian national life has been almost negligible. While Transylvania has supplied Roumania with a long succession of poets, journalists, doctors and politicians, Professor Stere, the distinguished Liberal deputy and economist, stands alone as the representative of Bessarabia.

In addition to the Roumanians of Hungary and Russia there are not less than 150,000 (perhaps 200,000) Roumanians in the Timok or north-west district of Serbia, and small scattered Roumanian colonies in Bulgaria along the whole southern bank of the Danube from Vidin to Silistria, amounting perhaps to 30–40,000 in all. But there is also a very large Roumanian population scattered throughout the centre and south of the Balkan Peninsula. These extremely interesting people, best known as the Coutzo-Vlachs, or in their own dialect "Aromuni," have been variously estimated at from 300,000 to 600,000. Such estimates can only be approximate, since all Balkan statistics are highly unreliable, but the truth probably lies nearer to the former than to the latter figure. There can be little doubt that the Vlachs form a much larger ethnical element in the population of Macedonia than Slav or Greek propagandists care to admit, but this is after all a point of mainly academic importance to-day, in view of the whole-

sale manner in which they have accepted assimilation during the last two generations. The Vlachs have already furnished Greece with many of the most zealous and munificent promoters of Hellenism, and the numbers of those who prefer to merge their identity in the Greek nation will tend to increase with every year.

A description of their history and distinctive characteristics lies quite outside the scope of the present essay. It is sufficient to point out the essential difference between their position and that of the Carpathian Roumanians. For the most obvious geographical reasons the Coutzo-Vlachs could never hope, and since the expulsion of the Turks can less than ever hope, for incorporation with the kingdom of Roumania, and their assimilation in the surrounding populations is probably only a matter of time. Meanwhile, the Coutzo-Vlach question no longer exists in the acute form which provoked such ill-feeling between Roumania and Greece some ten years ago. As a result of representations from Bucarest, the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian Governments each guaranteed educational and religious freedom for the Vlachs in their newly acquired territories and the continuance of Roumanian schools where they are desired.[1]

[1] Messrs. Wace and Thompson, whose volume on "The Nomads of the Balkans" is the last word on the Vlachs, put the total of Vlach-speaking persons at "not less than half a million," while Professor Weigand, the greatest living authority on Roumanian philology, puts it at 373,000.

IV.

SINCE the outbreak of the Great War speculation has been rife as to the probable attitude of Roumania, but the foundations upon which her policy must inevitably rest have received all too scant attention. The fact that Roumania did not instantly fling her armies into Transylvania seems to have puzzled many critics who had till recently ignored the very existence of Roumania, still more of her kinsmen in Hungary.

The explanation of her inaction is much more complex than is generally supposed; the contributory causes have been not few but many. In the first place it is not sufficiently realised that Roumania, though never actually a member of the Triple Alliance like Italy, was none the less bound to Austria-Hungary by a secret military convention for defensive purposes. The vital difference lay in the fact that while Italy's obligations had been ratified by successive Governments, by Parliament and by public opinion, those of Roumania were exclusively the work of King Charles himself, who, in recent years, had more than ever kept foreign policy in his own hands.

When war broke out the King summoned a Crown Council, consisting of the Cabinet and the leaders of the Opposition, and after an *exposé* of the international situation urged upon them the need for Roumania espousing the cause of her Austrian ally. When he went on to argue that the convention committed them to action, a Conservative statesman pointedly reminded him that neither he and his colleagues nor most of the members of the present Cabinet had ever seen the text of the convention, and that the secrecy with which it had been concluded ran counter to all constitutional practice, and, above all, to the tacit understanding that no engagements with foreign States were valid unless they had received the sanction of *both* political parties. A perusal of the text made it clear that the convention was purely defensive, and therefore entailed no obligation whatever upon Roumania in the event of Austrian aggression against Serbia. The King proceeded to draw a parallel between the relations of Italy and of Roumania towards Austria-Hungary, and argued that as Italian intervention on the side of the Triple Alliance was certain, Roumania could not lag behind. At this point, however, he was confronted by the news, just received officially in Bucarest some hours before, that Italy had declared her neutrality. This fact proved decisive, and King Charles, in urging war with Russia, found himself in a minority of one. In yielding to the inevitable, he could not repress the remark, "Gentlemen, you cannot

imagine how bitter it is to find oneself isolated in a country of which one is not a native"; and one of the most prominent of Roumanian statesmen is reported to have replied: "In peace time it was possible for Your Majesty to follow a policy contrary to the sentiment of the country, but to make war in defiance of that sentiment is impossible." Not content with this check, King Charles ordered a private and unofficial plebiscite among the Roumanian officers' corps, as a result of which only 110 out of about 6,000 expressed themselves in favour of marching against Russia.

Roumania remained neutral, and, indeed, last August this was the only course which could reasonably have been expected of her Government. King Charles's preference for the central Powers was based not merely upon his own personal feelings as a German and a Hohenzollern, but upon a firm belief in German invincibility and in the necessity for cordial relations between Bucarest, Vienna and Berlin. But quite a number of other circumstances combined to act as a heavy drag upon the Roumanian Government. As in 1870, public opinion was favourable to France, and from the very first there was not even a minority in favour of aiding her enemies. But it would obviously have been difficult, even at so supreme a moment of crisis, to break suddenly with a policy which had lasted for thirty years. Quite apart from the deep impression created by the German victories of August and September, there

was a very considerable body of opinion which advocated neutrality, and which had to be slowly converted to other views. Even on the national question public opinion was not quite ripe, for, though every Roumanian believes in the ultimate unity of the race, it is none the less true that till the war came upon Europe like a thief in the night, most people in Roumania, as elsewhere, regarded Roumanian unity as a very remote possibility. Hence in the opening months of the war the adherents of the Triple Entente had many obstacles to overcome before the public could accustom itself to the idea of intervention, and these obstacles were not lessened by the exertions of the German propaganda. As in all other neutral countries, large sums were squandered by German and Austrian agencies, and while their Press activity has resulted in a complete fiasco (they were unwise enough to acquire certain newspapers which had already been gravely compromised in the political world), they succeeded in many other insidious and subterranean ways. Nothing has been left untried, from slander and threats to innuendo and corruption, and there can be no doubt that the fear of German garrisons on the Transylvanian frontier has exercised as deterrent an effect upon one section of the society as has the desire to make profits out of the abnormal state of the oil and grain markets upon another and no less influential group.

Those who blame Roumania for her inaction

overlook two very important practical considerations. Like every other country in Europe, with one exception, Roumania was not ready for war. Despite her extensive armaments during the first Balkan war—armaments which certainly can hardly have been exhausted during the bloodless campaign against Bulgaria in July, 1913—the undoubted fact remains that Roumania was not ready in August, 1914. Her sanitary and medical corps was very inadequately equipped, and, most important of all, her stock of ammunition was far too scanty for operations on a grand scale. Almost all her orders had been placed with German armament firms, and as the autumn advanced Germany and Austria-Hungary showed a growing reluctance—for which it would be ridiculous to blame them—to allow even consignments which had been already paid for before the war to pass through their territory. Last December Roumania only had enough ammunition for a campaign of three months, and under such circumstances, with the end of the war still not even remotely in sight, it would have been madness to engage in hostilities unless and until she could assure herself of adequate supplies from western sources.

Moreover, Roumania may well be pardoned for her reluctance to engage upon a winter campaign in so difficult a country as the Transylvanian Alps, unless dire necessity forced her to do so: and events have proved that it is only now, after nine months of war, that the moment is at hand when her

entry could be decisive. It is more than doubtful whether her army could have turned the scale as long ago as October or November, and it is obvious that unless they had a fair prospect of doing so, her statesmen would not have been justified in involving the country in the vast additional expenditure of blood and treasure which a winter campaign would have entailed.

But even these considerations, important as they are, have merely been subsidiary. The true motives of Roumanian neutrality must be sought in the field of international policy. In so kaleidoscopic a situation as the present, it would be rash, and indeed indiscreet, to analyse them in too great detail, but a brief reference to them is essential to an understanding of the problem as a whole.

(1) The equivocal attitude of Bulgaria, especially in the opening stages of the war, unquestionably rendered Roumanian action to the north more difficult, and really cordial relations between Roumania and Bulgaria could only be restored by a reversal of the settlement of 1913. So deep-rooted was the mutual distrust of the two Governments that Roumania hesitated to move until Bulgaria had actually committed herself to something more than mere neutrality: otherwise it was feared that Sofia might wait until the Roumanian army was engaged in the Carpathians and then put forward peremptory demands for territorial concession in the Dobrugea. In order to gain so great a reward as Transylvania, the Roumanians

would naturally be prepared to disgorge the larger and more valuable portion of their acquisition during the second Balkan war, but this was, of course, a wholly inadequate bait for Bulgaria, who could not be expected to abandon her neutrality for anything less substantial than cessions of territory in Serbian and Greek Macedonia and in western Thrace. As none of these concessions depended upon Roumania, and as the Governments of Niš and Athens stubbornly refused to compromise, a deadlock resulted. Roumano-Bulgarian relations have greatly improved during last winter, but the necessary basis for an agreement is still lacking, though it may be reached at any moment. The Treaty of Bucarest was the punishment inflicted upon Bulgaria for her arrogance and perfidy in refusing arbitration and precipitating the second Balkan war: but it was never an ideal settlement. In establishing a Balkan balance of power, it imposed the only solution which at the moment had any chance of general acceptance, and it may fairly be regarded as a *pis-aller* calculated to avert an European conflagration. This was very generally recognized at the time; what was not equally understood was the fact that the outbreak of this conflagration *ipso facto* undermined the very foundations of the Bucarest settlement, and deprived it of its whole *raison d'être*. A readjustment of forces has become inevitable, and it is the refusal in several quarters to recognize this fact that is responsible for the Balkan stalemate of the past eight months.

(2) A further ground for Roumanian hesitation is to be found in the widespread belief, skilfully fostered by agents of the Central Powers, that the Russian Government, in encouraging Roumania to occupy Transylvania, was acting without the approval of Britain, and that our Government, so far from favouring Roumanian unity, was dreaming of a Great Hungary as an obstacle to Russian aggression.[1] The Magyar intrigues which were so noticeable in the British Press during last December and January deepened the alarm caused in Roumania by such rumours. The long series of articles from Budapest published by the *Morning Post* were treated as a proof of British sympathy with the Magyars[2]; and the Roumanian public, though not so foolish as to question their genuine character, realized from the first the notorious fact that only the first two or three letters could have crossed the Austrian frontier without the direct connivance of the Hungarian Government, and, knowing the co-operative system on which all national questions are treated as between Govern-

[1] One particular story deserves especial mention. Mr. Noel Buxton, whose attempted assassination in Bucarest by a Young Turk emissary had caused so great a sensation, was alleged to have advocated this policy in conversation with Roumanian politicians, and to have quoted it as the policy of Sir Edward Grey! Needless to say, Mr. Buxton never said anything of the kind.

[2] These articles were cited to me last January by an influential member of the present Roumanian Cabinet as a proof of British hostility to Roumanian aspirations; and nothing that I could say in defence of the British Press principle "audi alteram partem" seemed in any way to shake his conviction. He doubtless argued that in wartime such an argument can hardly pass muster.

ment and Opposition in Hungary, drew the not unnatural conclusion that Count Tisza was playing a secret game with influential circles in London.

(3) Finally, it is well to recognize that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russians cannot fail to be distasteful to Roumania, and that some special arrangement must be devised to allay her anxiety. There is a widespread feeling in this country that one inevitable result of victory for the Entente Powers must be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, and her consequent access to the Mediterranean. As, however, the Straits are Roumania's sole outlet to the open sea, their fate is to her of even more vital importance than to Russia herself, and no solution would be just which does not secure to Roumania the same rights of access for her commerce and her warships as to Russia. Long before this war broke out, serious Roumanian politicians were in the habit of asserting that even the realization of complete unity would be worthless if Russia at the same time acquired the Straits, and hence the power of drawing a noose round Roumania's neck. During the war a prominent Conservative statesman repeated to the present writer the same argument, adding that to a man hanging on a gibbet it was a matter of indifference whether he had his brother hanging at his side. This outlook must be seriously reckoned with, and there is good reason to believe that it is actually receiving the serious and friendly attention not only of the Western Powers but

also of Russia. Meanwhile the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Franco-British fleet might prove to be for Roumania the surest guarantee that her interests would not be ignored, but until the consummation of that event has cleared up the Balkan situation, she may be excused for displaying some nervous hesitation. Incidentally, the opening of the Straits, by permitting exports from the Danubian ports, would greatly ease Roumania's financial position and facilitate the importation of munitions of war. The present Prime Minister, Mr. Bratianu, is a convinced exponent of Realpolitik, a man who is influenced by facts not phrases. For many years he has shown a keen interest in Transylvania, but he has always represented the view that a small country, surrounded by powerful neighbours, is not entitled to indulge in a policy of adventure. The only way to convert Roumania's open sympathy for the allied cause into active intervention is to prove that we possess the energy and resolution to win, and the knowledge and diplomatic skill necessary to turn victory to full advantage.

It is easy enough to criticize the inaction of a country whose intervention would obviously suit our interest, but, when all is said and done, one decisive fact remains. Serbia and Belgium entered the war because they had no choice, whether in honour or dishonour; Britain because she had no choice in honour; but Roumania has been faced by that most momentous choice of all—

when free will decides our destiny and ruin or salvation depends upon the decision.

Meanwhile, Transylvania is waiting in fear and trembling for the day of liberation. In 1858, Roumania's ablest Foreign Minister, Cogalniceanu, speaking in the Moldavian Parliament, welcomed Wallachia with these words :—" We have the same origin as our brothers, the same name, language and faith ; in the past we have suffered the same griefs, and we now have to assure for ourselves the same future." These are words which every Roumanian would accept as fitting the present situation as regards Transylvania, and Britain, which has proclaimed the principle of nationality as one of the chief watchwords of the great struggle, cannot but welcome the realisation of Roumanian Unity. Last January the Conservative statesman, Mr. Take Jonescu, proposed in my presence the health of King George, and closed with these words : " Britain is fighting for us, and so much the worse for us if, to the very end, she should fight *for us, without us.*" This fact is fully understood by all Roumanians, and it is quite superfluous to remind them of the alternatives which face them—the " great refusal " of which Dante sings, or the national resurrection similar to that of her Italian kinsmen.

APPENDICES

If Roumania enters the war it can only be with one object—the conquest of Transylvania. Hence no survey of the problem would be complete which did not offer the reader some means of studying the distribution of the population in the provinces of "Romania Irredenta." The only serious statistics available are those published by the Magyar Government, and it is notorious that these unduly favour the Magyar element (for a striking example of this *see* Appendix II.). They none the less form a possible basis of enquiry.

Appendix I. shows the population of Transylvania and of the Roumanian counties of Hungary proper according to nationality.

Appendix II. contrasts the religious and ethnographical statistics in the same area.

Appendices III. and IV. analyse the ethnographical statistics in the seven counties on the Magyar-Roumanian frontier, according to district, and divide them into three classes—(*a*) Roumanian, (*b*) Mixed, (*c*) Non-Roumanian.

Appendices V. and VI. analyse the ethnographical conditions in the mixed districts dealt with in Appendix III., and show that a further separation of the two races is possible.

Appendix VII. shows the racial minorities which must inevitably be included in the new state, *as a minimum*, if Roumanian unity is to be achieved.

Appendix IX. summarizes the main lines of a just settlement between the territorial claims of Roumania, Hungary and Serbia.

All the figures quoted are taken from *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Vol. XLII., Budapest, 1912 (containing details of the census of 1910).

APPENDIX I.

THE ROUMANIAN COUNTIES OF HUNGARY (1910).

	Roumanian.	p.c.	Magyar.	p.c.	German.	p.c.	Total.
I. TRANSYLVANIA.[1]							
Alsó-Fehér (Alba de Jos) ...	171,483	77·4	39,107	17.6	7,269		221,618
Bestercze-Naszód (Bistrita-Nasaud)	87,564	68·5	10,737	8·4	25,609		127,843
Brassó (Brasov)	35,091	34·7	35,372	35·0	29,542		101,199
Fogaras (Fagaras)	84,436	88·7	6,466	6·8	3,236		95,174
Hunyad (Huniedoara)	271,675	79·9	52,720	15·5	8,101		340,135
Kis-Küküllö (Tarnavele-Mici) ...	55,585	47·9	34,902	30·1	20,272		116,091
Kolozs (Cojocna)	153,717	68·0	60,735	26·9	6,710		225,879
Kolozsvár (Cluj) Town of ...	7,562	12·4	50,704	83·4	1,676		60,808
Nagy Küküllö (Tarnavele-Mari)	60,381	40·6	18,474	12·4	62,224		148,826
Szeben (Sibiu)	113,672	64·3	10,159	5·7	49,757		176,921
Szolnok-Doboka (Solnoc-Dobaca)	189,443	75·2	52,181	20·7	6,902		251,936
Torda-Aranyos (Turda Aries) ...	125,668	72·1	44,630	25·6	576		174,375
Maros-Torda (Muras-Turda) ...	70,192	36·2	111,376	57·4	7,706		194,072
Maros-Vásárhely, Town of ...	1,717	6·7	22,790	89·3	606		25,517
THE SZEKEL COUNTIES.							
Csik	18,032	12·4	125,888	86·4	1,080		145,720
Háromszék	22,963	15·5	123,518	83·4	617		148,080
Udvarhely	2,840	2·3	118,458	95·4	2,202		124,173
Total (Transylvania)	1,472,021	55·0	918,217	34·3	234,085	8·7	2,678,367

[1] Magyar names (Roumanian names in brackets).

THE ROUMANIAN COUNTIES OF HUNGARY (1910).—*continued.*

	Roumanian.		Magyar.		German.	Serb.	Total.
II. HUNGARY PROPER.		p.c.		p.c.		(Ruthene)	
Máramaros (Maramuraș) ...	84,510	23·6	52,964	14·8	59,552	159,489	357,705
Szatmár (Satu-Mare)	118,774	32·8	235,291	65·1	6,041	—	361,740
Szatmár Németi, Town	986	2·8	33,094	94·9	629	—	34,892
Szilágy (Salagiu)	136,087	59·1	87,312	38·0	816	—	230,140
Bihar	261,494	44·9	307,221	52·8	2,183	—	582,132
Nagy-Várad, Town (Oradea Mure, Grosswardein).	3,604	5·6	58,421	91·1	1,416	—	64,169
Arad	229,476	65·3	78,130	22·2	34,330	322	351,222
Arad, Town	10,279	16·3	46,085	73·0	4,365	1,816	63,166
Temes (Timis)	160,585	40·1	47,518	11·9	120,683	57,821	400,910
Temesvár, Town	7,566	10·4	28,552	39·4	31,644	3,482	72,555
Versecz, Town	879	3·2	3,890	14·2	13,556	8,602	27,370
Torontál	86,168	14·5	125,041	21·0	158,312	191,036	594,343
Pančevo Town (Pancsova) ...	769	3·7	3,364	16·2	7,467	8,714	20,808
Krassó-Szörény (Caras-Severin)	336,082	72·1	33,787	7·3	55,883	14,674	466,147
Total	1,437,259	39·6	1,140,670	31·4	496,877	285,467	3,627,299
Total Population in Roumanian Area of Hungary...	2,909,300	46·1	2,058,887	32·6	731,962	285,476	6,305,666

N.B.—The Counties of Ugocsa, Békés, and Csanád, otherwise pure Magyar, contain tiny Roumanian minorities of 9,750, 6,125, and 14,046 respectively; but under no circumstances have the Roumanians any claim to these counties.

APPENDIX II.

THE ROUMANIANS OF HUNGARY—RELIGION AND NATIONALITY.

	Orthodox	Uniate	Total Orthodox and Uniate.	Roumanian
I. TRANSYLVANIA.				
Alsó-Fehér ...	89,724	85,276	175,000	171,483
B. Naszód ...	16,615	72,494	89,109	87,564
Brassó	35,585	979	36,564	35,091
Fogaras	61,881	23,651	85,532	84,436
Hunyad	217,425	60,024	277,449	271,675
K. Küküllö ...	19,438	41,323	60,761	55,585
Kolozs	40,356	117,571	157,927	153,717
Kolozsvár	1,359	8,646	10,005	7,562
N. Küküllö ...	51,622	17,145	68,767	60,381
Szeben	99,952	16,064	116,016	113,672
Szolnok-Doboka ...	38,608	155,364	193,972	189,443
Torda-Aranyos ...	56,748	72,672	129,420	125,668
Maros-Torda ...	30,505	47,689	78,194	70,192
Maros-Vásárhely ...	761	2,222	2,983	1,717
THE SZEKEL COUNTIES.				
Csík	263	23,724	23,987	18,032
Háromszék ...	28,077	3,052	31,129	22,963
Udvarhely... ...	4,020	1,387	5,407	2,840
Total	792,864	749,404	1,542,268	1,472,021
II. THE BANAT.				Roumanian and Serb.
Temes	211,286	11,550	222,836	218,406
Temesvár Town ...	11,227	748	11,975	11,048
Versecz Town ...	9,544	83	9,627	9,481
Torontál	277,281	3,603	280,884	277,204
Pančevo Town ...	9,361	225	9,586	9,483
Krassó Szörény ...	337,153	20,006	357,159	350,756
Total	855,852	36,215	892,067	876,378
Total in all Hungary*	2,333,979	2,007,916	4,341,895	—

* Including counties not given in this Appendix.

Totals are given according to the Hungarian Statistical Year Book, but in certain instances it will be found that they are not added up correctly (there being a discrepancy of some hundreds).

The foregoing table reveals a remarkable discrepancy in the Magyar official statistics. It is notorious that the only nationalities in Hungary which profess the Orthodox faith are the Roumanians and Serbs, while the Uniate Church is recruited from the Roumanians and Ruthenes with the addition of 60–70,000 Magyars (for the most part really Magyarized Ruthenes). If, however, we add together the total Orthodox and Uniate population of Transylvania, we find that it exceeds the total Roumanian population by 70,247. Yet, on the one hand, there are no Ruthenes in those counties, and, on the other hand, there are no Magyar or German Orthodox. These 70,000 persons are therefore presumably Uniates, and, as the Magyar Uniates live almost exclusively in Hungary proper and not in Transylvania, they must be Roumanians who have been described in the census as Magyars.

If, again, we add together the total Orthodox and Uniate population of Hungary, we find that it exceeds the total Roumanian, Serb and Ruthene population of Hungary by as much as 467,923. After allowing for the Magyar Uniates above referred to, there are still at the very least 350,000 unaccounted for. This gives some idea of the methods by which Magyar statistics are prepared, and justifies us in assuming that the Magyar population of the Roumanian districts of Hungary is really very much lower than these official figures suggest.

Total in all Hungary :—

Orthodox	2,333,979	Roumanian	2,948,186
Uniate	2,007,916	Serb	464,270
		Ruthene	466,516
	4,341,895		3,878,972

APPENDIX III.

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SEVEN COUNTIES ON THE MAGYAR-ROUMANIAN LINGUISTIC FRONTIER.

			Magyar.	Roumanian.	Ruthene.	German.	Total.
I. Máramaros.	A. Ruthene districts—	1 Huszt	8,480	—	32,630	5,480	46,650
		2 Técsö	5,544	—	15,073	3,670	24,616
		3 Taraczviz ...	1,358	—	24,814	7,545	33,762
		4 Tiszavölgy ...	6,166	—	25,481	5,009	36,943
		5 Okörmezö ...	673	—	16,168	2,285	15,589
		6 Dolha	610	—	26,054	4,947	31,704
			22,831	—	140,220	28,936	189,264
	B. Roumanian districts—						
		7 Izavölgy	—	22,102	—	4,980	27,580
		8 Sugatag	2,054	22,875	—	3,175	28,218
			2,054	44,977	—	8,155	55,798
	C. Mixed districts—						
		9 Visó	1,815	19,863	9,148	13,276	44,206
		10 Sziget	8,309	17,242	9,540	7,928	43,067
		11 Máramaros Sziget Town ...	17,542	2,001	532	1,257	21,370
			27,666*	39,106	19,220	22,461	108,643
	Total in County		52,964	84,510	159,489	59,552	357,705
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)		30,133	84,510	19,269	30,616	168,441

* N.B.—Minorities of under 500 have been omitted, with a view to simplifying the result; but they have *not* been subtracted from the totals in each county.

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SEVEN COUNTIES ON THE MAGYAR-ROUMANIAN LINGUISTIC FRONTIER.—*continued.*

		Magyar.	Roumanian.	Ruthene.	German.	Total.
II. Szatmár.	A. Magyar districts—					
	1 Mátészalka ...	44,979	—	—	928	45,191
	2 Fehér Gyarmat ...	31,518	—	—	—	31,631
	3 Nagykároly ...	36,588	6,748	—	—	43,726
	4 Csenger	27,134	1,667	—	—	28,899
	5 Szatmár	29,634	4,310	—	—	34,093
	6 Szatmár Németi Town	33,094	986	—	629	34,892
		202,947	13,763	—	2,142	218,432
	B. Roumanian districts—					
	7 Avas	5,199	17,886	—	928	24,365
	8 Nagybánya ...	4,626	25,608	—	—	30,584
	9 „ (Town) ...	9,992	2,677	—	—	12,877
	10 Felsöbánya (Town)	4,149	230	—	—	4,422
	11 Nagysomkut ...	4,404	24,882	—	—	30,027
	12 Szinerváralya ...	7,770	20,049	—	—	28,136
	13 Erdöd	13,526	14,449	—	3,527	31,711
		49,666	105,781	—	—	162,122
	Total in County	268,385	119,760	—	6,670	396,632
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)	65,438	105,997	—	4,528	178,200
III. Szilágy.	Mixed districts (inseparable on a racial basis)—					
	1 Tasnád	19,471	18,719	—	—	38,889
	2 Szilágy Cseh ...	14,279	27,853	—	—	42,767
	3 Szilágy Somlyó ...	15,949	17,052	—	—	34,957
	4 „ (Town) ...	6,030	759	—	—	6,885
	5 Zilah	12,636	24,401	—	—	37,644
	6 „ (Town) ...	7,477	529	—	—	8,062
	7 Zsibó	4,503	24,574	—	—	29,456
	8 Kraszna	6,967	22,200	—	—	31,480
	Total in County	87,312	136,087	—	816	230,140

IV. Bihar.	A. Magyar districts—					
	1 Ermihályfalva ...	25,072	2,928	—	—	28,068
	2 Székelyhid ...	31,674	1,418	—	—	33,318
	3 Derecske... ...	25,412	—	—	—	25,468
	4 Sárrét	23,836	—	—	—	23,913
	5 Berettyóujfalus ...	31,633	1,935	—	—	33,666
	6 Bihar Keresztés...	28,638	2,824	—	—	31,551
		166,265	9,114	—	—	175,984
	B. Roumanian districts—					
	7 Margitta	20,540	16,581	—	—	41,197
	8 Elesd	8,278	39,399	—	—	51,381
	9 Magyar Cséke ...	2,239	28,517	—	—	31,234
	10 Belényes ...	8,399	40,890	—	—	49,711
	11 Vaskoh	1,133	27,959	—	—	29,368
	12 Béel	1,174	17,847	—	—	19,530
	13 Tenke	8,558	22,666	—	—	31,614
		50,321	193,859	—	—	254,035
	C. Mixed districts—					
	14 Szalárd	16,683	9,194	—	—	26,528
	15 Központ... ...	21,789	24,465	—	—	47,516
	16 Nagyvárad (Grosswardein) Town	58,421	3,604	—	—	64,169
	17 Cséffa	16,949	12,988	—	—	30,583
	18 Nagy Szalonta ...	35,214	11,794	—	—	47,486
		149,056	62,045	—	—	216,282
	Total in County	365,642	265,098	—	—	646,301
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)	199,377	255,984	—	—	470,317

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SEVEN COUNTIES ON THE MAGYAR-ROUMANIAN LINGUISTIC FRONTIER.—*continued.*

		Magyar.	Roumanian	German.	Serb.	Total.
V. Arad.	A. Magyar districts—					
	1 Pécska	15,620	9,736	—	—	30,289
	2 Elek	9,405	11,826	—	—	34,209
	3 Arad	10,374	19,934	—	—	39,385
	4 Arad Town ...	46,085	10,279	—	—	63,166
		81,484	51,775	—	—	167,049
	manian districts—					
	5 Kisjenö	19,640	29,804	—	—	52,536
	6 Borosjenö ...	5,834	30,687	—	—	37,421
	7 Világos	7,264	20,941	—	—	37,980
	8 Boros Sebes ...	3,783	32,008	—	—	36,443
	9 N. Halmágy ...	561	20,322	—	—	21,030
	10 Tornova	2,711	24,364	—	—	27,476
	11 Radna	2,938	29,854	—	—	34,453
		42,731	187,980	—	—	247,339
	Total in County	124,215	239,755	—	—	414,388
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)	42,731	187,980	—	—	247,339

VI. Temes.	A. Roumanian districts—					
	1 Lippa	2,703	21,215	10,646	—	34,833
	2 Uj Arad	3,071	9,289	19,319	2,036	34,117
	3 Rékás	5,462	19,748	5,576	3,144	35,933
	4 Vinga	4,343	10,408	12,670	3,711	34,104
	5 Központ	6,092	16,109	22,635	897	46,372
	6 Temesvár Town...	28,552	7,566	31,644	3,482	72,555
	7 Buziás	6,277	22,820	5,654	—	35,762
	8 Csákova	2,949	17,376	8,992	621	30,479
	9 Detta	5,722	9,701	9,146	1,943	28,495
	10 Versecz	3,422	18,174	8,605	5,531	36,978
	11 Versecz Town ...	3,890	879	13,556	8,602	27,370
		72,483	153,285	148,443	30,129	416,998
	B. Serb districts—					
	12 Fehértemplom (Weisskirchen, Bela Crkva) ...	909	8,234	4,791	20,987	36,831
	13 Kevevára ...	5,355	5,705	6,587	16,795	35,482
		6,264	13,939	11,378	37,782	72,313
	Total in County	79,960	169,030	165,883	69,905	500,835
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)	73,696	155,091	154,505	32,123	428,522

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SEVEN COUNTIES ON THE MAGYAR-ROUMANIAN LINGUISTIC FRONTIER.—*continued.*

			Magyar.	Roumanian.	German.	Serb.	Total.
VII. Torontál.	A. Magyar districts—						
		1 Tör. Kanizsa ...	24,961	2,058	2,961	17,099	47,639
		2 Nagy Szent-Miklós	10,982	10,239	12,921	2,830	43,442
			35,943	12,297	15,882	19,929	91,081
	B. Serb districts—						
		3 Nagy Kikinda (Veliki Kikinda)	7,298	—	9,875	15,351	33,009
		4 Török Bečse ...	14,136	—	1,054	32,938	48,464
		5 Nagy Becskerek (Veliki Bečkerek)	8,573	10,581	16,485	14,445	54,715
		6 Zsombolya ...	12,026	4,643	25,552	3,687	46,904
		7 Antalfalva ...	5,957	5,442	1,849	24,530	47,044
		8 Pancsova (Pančevo) ...	3,148	10,735	15,573	14,930	47,877
		9 Pancsova Town...	3,364	769	7,467	8,714	20,808
			54,502	32,170	77,855	114,595	298,823
	C. Roumanian district—						
		10 Perjámos... ...	1,352	8,218	16,692	3,416	30,334
	D. Mixed districts (Roumano-Serb)—						
		11 Csene	3,736	3,626	16,468	5,765	30,936
		12 Párdány	6,098	4,007	7,153	9,708	27,171
		13 Módos	4,685	3,877	9,905	6,959	27,048
		14 Banlak	6,385	6,627	8,403	4,503	27,667
		15 Alibunar ...	588	14,982	755	11,743	29,292
			21,492	33,129	42,884	38,678	142,074
	Total in County		128,405	86,937	165,779	199,750	615,151
	Total do. (after subtracting non-Roumanian districts)		37,960	66,422	72,042	65,226	225,247

APPENDIX IV.

SUMMARY.—RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE SAME SEVEN COUNTIES, AFTER SUBTRACTING THE PURELY NON-ROUMANIAN DISTRICTS.

	Magyar.	p. c.	Roumanian.	p. c.	German.	Serb.	Total.
Máramaros	30,133	17·8	84,510	50·0	30,616	—	168,441
Szatmár	65,438	36·5	105,997	58·9	4,528	—	178,200
Szilágy	87,312	37·8	136,087	59·1	816	—	230,140
Bihar	199,377	42·3	255,984	54·2	—	—	470,317
Arad	42,731	17·0	187,980	75·7	38,695	—	247,339
Temes	73,696	17·0	155,091	36·1	154,505	32,123	428,522
Torontál	37,960	16·4	66,422	29·3	72,042	65,226	225,247
	536,647	27·9	992,071	51·8	262,507	97,349	1,908,206

APPENDIX V.

Racial Distribution in the Mixed Districts of the same Seven Counties.

	Roumanian	Ruthene.	Total.
I. Máramaros. County.			
1 Visó District. Total ...	19,863	9,148	44,206
1 Havasmezö	—	4,095	5,226
2 Oroszkö...	—	1,533	1,789
3 Petrova...	1,869	1,376	4,229
4 Visóoroszi	—	1,655	2,861
	1,901	8,659	14,105
(after subtracting result from total in District)	17,962	489	30,101
2 Sziget District. Total ...	17,242	9,540	43,067
5 Felsöapsa	—	3,594	4,704
6 Felsöróna	—	2,547	3,137
7 Szent Mihály Körtvélyes	—	1,544	1,705
8 Tisza Karácsony ...	—	1,101	2,517
	79	8,786	12,063
II. Szatmár } indivisible on a racial basis. III. Szilagy }	17,163	754	31,004

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE MIXED DISTRICTS OF THE SAME SEVEN COUNTIES—(*continued*).

	Magyar.	Roumanian	Total.
IV. BIHAR.			
1 Szálard District. Total...	16,683	9,194	26,528
1 B. félegyháza	1,589	16	1,609
2 B. Vajda	733	31	765
3 Hegyközcsatar... ...	1,554	11	1,567
4 Hegyköz-Szt Imre ...	1,233	3	1,236
5 Hegyközléttelek ...	512	7	544
6 Jakóhodos	1,058	17	1,093
7 Kismarja	2,476	—	2,476
8 Nyüved...	596	11	608
9 Paptamási	1,013	57	1,074
10 Siter	1,070	83	1,164
11 Szalard	2,349	45	2,404
	13,683	271	14,540
(after subtracting) ...	3,000	8,923	11,988
2 Központ District. Total	21,789	24,465	47,516
12 Bihar	3,021	1	3,027
13 B. Püspöki	3,489	126	3,650
14 Fugyivásárhely ...	1,767	432	2,338
15 Hegyközkovácsi ...	819	8	830
16 Hegyközpalyi	815	3	820
17 Hegyközszáldobágy ...	850	1	851
18 Hegyközujlak	1,110	—	1,127
19 Koröstarján	1,261	972	2,234
20 Mezötelezd	2,528	591	3,267
21 Pósalaka	569	16	588
22 Pusztaujlak	724	31	757
23 Váradszöllös	1,075	49	1,141
	18,028	2,230	20,530
(after subtracting) ...	3,760	22,235	26,986
3 Nagyvárad Town ...	58,421	3,604	64,169
4 Cséffa District	16,949	12,988	30,583
25 Biharugra	1,952	251	2,224
26 Geszt	1,588	254	1,843
27 Körösnagyharsány ...	1,336	73	1,411
28 Mezögyán	2,185	67	2,258
29 Okány	4,010	69	4,085
30 Sarkad Keresztur ...	1,532	493	2,084
31 Zsadány	2,557	7	2,566
	15,180	1,214	16,471
(after subtracting) ...	1,769	11,774	14,112

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE MIXED DISTRICTS OF THE SAME SEVEN COUNTIES—(*continued*).

	Magyar.	Roumanian	Total.
IV. BIHAR—*continued.*			
5 Nagy Szalonta District ...	35,214	11,794	47,486
32 Ant	1,112	55	1,181
33 Arpád	1,638	46	1,686
34 Erdögyarak	1,601	299	2,002
35 Kötegyán	2,772	157	2,951
36 Mezöbaj	1,331	112	1,443
37 Nagy Szalonta... ...	15,206	650	15,943
38 Sarkad	9,428	79	9,587
39 Tamáshida	1,047	910	1,988
	34,135	2,308	36,381
(after subtracting) ...	1,079	9,486	11,105
V. ARAD.			
1 Kisjenö District	19,640	29,804	52,536
1 Agya	2,034	35	2,082
2 Bélszerend	489	44	533
3 Erdöhegy	1,875	473	2,394
4 Feketegyarmat ...	1,994	10	2,009
5 Nagyszerénd	2,536	87	2,637
6 Simonyifalva	2,276	30	2,484
7 Szapáryliget	1,315	44	2,758
8 Vadász	1,761	582	2,448
	14,280	1,275	17,335
(after subtracting) ...	5,360	28,529	35,201
VI. TEMES.	Roumanian	Serb.	Total.
1 Fehértemplon District. ... (all 16 Serb, except)	8,234	20,987	36,831
1 Gerebencz	2,292	68	2,443
2 Temesmiklós	3,238	31	3,483
3 Temesör	1,544	25	1,678
	7,074	124	7,604
(after subtracting) ...	1,160	20,863	29,227
VII. TORONTÁL.	Roumanian	Serb.	Total.
1 Csene District	3,626	5,765	30,936
1 Nagyköcse	1,376	624	2,478
2 Oregfalu	820	32	1,353
3 Papd	787	37	1,182
	2,983	693	5,013
	643	5,072	25,923

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE MIXED DISTRICTS OF THE SAME SEVEN COUNTIES—(*continued*).

	Roumanian Provinces.	Serb.	Total.
VII. TORONTAL—*continued.*			
2 Párdány District	4,007	9,708	27,171
4 Csebze	1,493	16	1,638
5 Fény	1,232	491	2,037
6 Torontálgyülvész ...	967	5	1,467
	3,692	512	5,142
(after subtracting) ...	315	9,196	25,029
3 Módos District.	3,877	6,959	27,048
7 Maczedónia	988	22	1,089
8 Szárcsatelek	1,258	2	1,339
9 Tógyér	906	36	1,152
	3,152	60	3,580
(after subtracting) ...	725	6,899	23,468
4 Bánlak District	6,637	4,503	27,667
10 Bánlak	2,160	42	2,836
11 Nagymargitta	1,039	687	1,847
12 Partos	716	68	1,639
13 Szentjános	1,323	48	1,568
	5,238	845	7,890
(after subtracting) ...	1,399	3,658	19,777
5 Alibunar District... ...	14,982	11,743	29,292
14 Alibunar	2,717	1,666	4,503
15 Keviszöllö	2,540	29	2,664
16 Petre	5,507	85	5,837
17 Végszentmihály ...	3,992	25	4,095
	14,856	1,805	17,099
(after subtracting) ...	126	9,938	12,193

APPENDIX VI.

Summary of Two Previous Tables.

	Magyar.	Roumanian.	Ruthene.	German.	Total.
1. Máramaros County.					
A. Total	52,964	84,510	159,489	59,552	357,705
B. Subtract 6 Ruthene districts (see p. 77)	22,831	—	140,220	28,936	189,264
	30,133	84,510	19,269	30,616	168,441
C. Subtract again 8 communes of the districts of Visó and Sziget (see p. 84)	755	1,980	17,445	7,550	26,168
	29,378	82,530	1,824	23,066	142,273
2. Szatmar County.					
A. Total	268,385	119,760	—	6,670	396,632
B. Subtract 6 Magyar districts (see p. 78)	202,947	13,763	—	2,142	258,432
	65,438	105,997	—	4,528	138,200
3. Szilagy County.					
4. Bihar County.					
A. Total	365,642	265,098	—	—	646,301
B. Subtract 6 Magyar districts (see p. 79)	166,265	9,114	—	—	175,984
	199,377	255,984	—	—	470,317
C. Subtract again 39 communes of 5 districts (see p. 85) ...	139,447	9,627	—	—	152,091
	59,930	246,357	—	—	318,226

SUMMARY OF TWO PREVIOUS TABLES.—(*continued*).

	Magyar.	Roumanian.	German.	Serb.	Total.
5. ARAD COUNTY.					
A. Total	124,215	239,755	—	—	414,388
B. Subtract 4 Magyar districts (see p. 80)	81,484	51,775	—	—	167,049
	42,731	187,980	—	—	247,339
C. Subtract again 8 communes of Kisjenö district (see p. 86)	14,280	1,275	—	—	17,335
	28,451	186,705	—	—	230,004
4. TEMES COUNTY.					
A. Total	79,960	169,030	165,883	69,905	500,835
B. Subtract 2 Serb districts (see p. 86)	6,264	13,939	11,378	37,782	72,313
	73,696	155,091	154,505	32,123	428,522
C. Subtract again 16 Serb communes of Fehértemplom district	849	1,160	4,714	20,863	29,227
	72,847	153,931	149,791	11,260	399,295
5. TORONTÁL COUNTY.					
A. Total	128,405	86,937	165,779	199,750	615,151
B. Subtract 2 Magyar and 7 Serb districts (see p. 82) ...	90,445	44,467	93,737	134,524	389,904
	37,960	66,422	72,042	65,226	225,247
C. Subtract again 17 communes of 5 districts (see p. 87) ...	2,811	29,921	2,007	3,915	38,724
	35,149	36,501	70,035	61,311	183,523

APPENDIX VII

Roumanian Unity and Racial Minorities

Most controversialists, in discussing the Roumanians of Hungary, content themselves with quoting the figures of *all* the counties inhabited by Roumanians, and make no attempt to divide them up on an ethnographical basis. The very large non-Roumanian element in the area under discussion is then apt to be quoted as a proof of the impossibility of solving the problem on a basis of nationality.

My present analysis follows other lines. It will be seen from Appendix I. that in what may be described as the Roumanian area of Hungary (including of course the Szekel districts as a racial islet), there are, *on the basis of existing county boundaries*, no fewer than 2,058,887 Magyars, 730,962 Germans, 159,489 Ruthenes and 285,467 Serbs. If we exclude those districts of the seven counties on the linguistic frontier which are purely Magyar by race, we reduce the number of Magyars from 2,058,887 to 1,488,651, and by a further process of division in the mixed districts along the racial fringe, it is possible to reduce the latter figure to 1,330,509. This, then, represents the number of Magyars, who, according to their own official statistics, must inevitably be sacrificed, if the dream of Roumanian unity is to be achieved. In view of the facts alluded to in Appendix I., there can be very little doubt that these Magyars

do not in reality number more than 1,000,000. Of these 501,930 are the Szekels of Eastern Transylvania, living in a compact mass; and for them some special privileges must be secured.

Under such an arrangement the Roumanians on their side would sacrifice 153,089, consisting of small minorities scattered about in the otherwise purely Magyar and Serb counties of the great Hungarian plain.

In the Banat no human skill could disentangle the various races; and a new frontier, based so far as possible on equitable racial division, would leave about 66,000 Roumanians in the new Serbia and about 65,000 Serbs in the new Roumania. Under such circumstances it might be possible to devise some gradual system of exchange, by which the Roumanian minorities were transferred from Magyar territory and the Magyar (as opposed to the Szekel) minorities from Roumanian territory.

The following table shows the irreducible minimum of non-Roumanian population which it will be necessary for Roumania to annex, in order to unite her own race.

A.—On Basis of Existing County Divisions.

	Magyar.	Roumanian.	German.	Ruthene.	Total.
I. Hungary Proper.					
1 Máramaros	52,964	84,510	59,552	(159,489)	357,705
2 Szatmár	268,385	119,760	6,670	—	396,632
3 Szilágy	87,312	136,087	816	—	230,140
4 Bihar...	365,642	265,098	3,599	—	646,301
				Serb.	
5 Arad	124,215	239,755	38,695	2,138	414,388
6 Temes	119,960	169,030	165,883	69,905	500,835
7 Torontál	128,405	86,937	165,779	199,750	615,151
8 Krassó-Szörény	33,787	336,082	55,883	14,674	466,147
	1,140,670	1,437,279	496,877	285,467	3,627,299
I. Transylvania.					
(As in Appendix I.)	918,217	1,472,021	234,085	—	2,678,367
Total	2,058,887	2,909,300	731,962	285,467	6,305,666
	32·6 p.c.	46·1 p.c.	11·5 p.c.	4·5 p.c.	

B.—(After Subtracting Non-Roumanian Districts, as in Appendices III.–VI.)

	Magyar.	Roumanian.	German.	Ruthene.	Total.
I. Hungary Proper.					
1 Máramaros	29,378	82,530	23,066	1,824	142,273
2 Szatmár	65,438	105,997	4,528	—	138,200
3 Szilágy	87,312	136,087	816	—	230,140
4 Bihar...	59,930	246,357	1,727	—	318,226
5 Arad	28,451	186,705	12,092	—	230,004
				Serb.	
6 Temes	72,847	153,931	149,791	11,260	399,295
7 Torontál	35,149	36,501	70,035	61,311	186,523
8 Krasso-Szörény	33,787	336,082	55,883	14,674	466,147
	412,292	1,284,190	317,938	87,245	2,110,808
II. Transylvania.					
(As in Appendix I.)	918,217	1,472,021	234,085	—	2,678,367
Total	1,330,509	2,756,211	552,023	87,245	4,789,175
	27·7 p.c.	57·5 p.c.	11·5 p.c.	1·8 p.c.	

APPENDIX VIII.

The Szekel and Saxon Minorities.

The Szekel Minorities—County.			
	Csík	125,888	86·4
	Háromszék	123,518	83·4
	Udvarhely	118,458	95·4
	Maros-Torda ...	111,376	57·4
	Maros-Vásárhely (town) ...	22,790	89·3
		501,930	
The Saxon Minorities—			
	Nagy Küküllö ...	62,224	41·8
	Szeben	49,757	28·1
	Brassó	29,542	29·2
	B-Naszód	25,609	20·0
	Kis-Küküllö	20,272	17·5
	Hunyad	8,101	2·4
	Also-Fehér	7,269	3·3
	Other counties ...	31,311	—
		234,085	—

APPENDIX IX.

The New Frontier and a Just Settlement.

In the event of the victory of the Allies, the partition of Austria-Hungary is inevitable, and Russia will annex not only Galicia but also the Ruthene districts of Hungary, with the towns of Ungvár and Munkács. In that event the county of Máramaros would fall to be divided between Russia and Roumania, and the river Theiss (Tisza) would form at once a natural and a fairly accurate ethnographical frontier. The town of Máramaros Sziget, being on the south bank, would fall to Roumania. Leaving the Theiss a little south of Huszt, the frontier would presumably follow the line of the Avas hills, then, cutting the county of Szatmár in half and crossing the river Szamos, would follow the N.W. boundary of the county of Szilágy. It would then strike across the county of Bihar to the outskirts of Grosswardein (Nagyvárad, Oradea Mare), and thence past Nagy Szalonta to the river Körös east of Gyula. Thence almost straight south to the river Maros at a point 3 or 4 miles east of Arad. It would then follow the course of the Maros to near Nagylak, then the course of the Aranka, the old and now neglected channel of the Maros. A triangular piece of territory, of which the important Hungarian town of Szeged is the apex and which is mainly Magyar by race, would thus be retained by Hungary. The new frontier between Roumania and Serbia

would begin at a point on the Aranka, roughly halfway between Maros and Theiss, and would follow a S.E. course to the Danube near Moldova. The towns of Kikinda, Bečkerek, Pančevo and Weisskirchen (Bela Crkva, Fehértemplom) would fall to the Serbs, who have an overwhelming majority in the western districts of the county of Torontál; while Temesvár and probably Versecz would fall to Roumania.

Certain extremists in Bucarest are already advancing claims to the whole Banat as far as the river Theiss; but such a claim has absolutely no foundation in history, tradition, geography or ethnography. On the other hand the Serbian claims to the Western Banat are unanswerable on racial grounds; while on strategic grounds they are if possible even more overwhelming, since the acquisition of the whole Banat by Roumania would leave Belgrade within range of the guns of a foreign State. The Serbian capital would merely have exchanged one unwelcome neighbour for another, and a permanent source of friction would remain between two States and races whom nature has intended for friends and allies.

In the same way the Roumanian Chauvinists claim the overwhelmingly Magyar towns of Arad and Grosswardein; and it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Roumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come.

The watchword of "the line of the Theiss" is of course merely ridiculous; for its acquisition would involve the occupation of the purest Magyar districts in Hungary and even Debreczen itself.

the stronghold of Magyar Calvinism. Such a gross violation of the principle of nationality would render an independent Hungary impossible. The excessive claims of Roumania form an exact parallel to those of Italy to the purely Serbo-Croat province of Dalmatia.

Even as it is, the Roumanians will be saddled with very considerable minorities, which, unless treated with due consideration, may prove a source of the gravest embarrassment to them. Hence no settlement can be regarded as satisfactory or permanent which does not secure to these minorities —notably the Saxons and Szekels—the fullest possible liberty for their language, schools, churches and cultural institutions. The Saxons in particular have led their own life and preserved their national identity for seven centuries, and any attempt to assimilate so interesting a people would be a crime of the most gratuitous kind.

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Only a very large scale map can give any accurate idea of the extraordinary intermingling of races in Austria-Hungary. In the present instance many of the smaller groups have inevitably been omitted for obvious reasons of space.

In the Serb districts no attempt has been made to indicate minorities.

Erratum: The names of the two coast towns Constanța and Mangalia should be transposed.

INDEX

AGRARIAN REFORM, 19, 28
Albanians, 6
Albert, King, 20
Andrássy, Count, the elder, 23
————, the younger, 52, 54
Apponyi, Count, 52
Apulum, 7
Arad, 42, 96
Aurelian, 7
Austro-Russian rivalry, 4, 15, 17

BALKAN PENINSULA, 2, 4, 14, 23
Bánffy, Baron, 51
Baritiu, George, 46
Belgrade, 14, 96
Berlin, Congress of, 25
Bessarabia, 12, 14, 31, 57-8
Bismarck, 27
Black Sea, 3
Blaj (Blasendorf), 40
Bosnia, 11, 24
Bratianu, Jon, 17, 21, 22, 25
————, Mr., 70
Britain, 18, 23, 31
Bucarest, 4, 8, 15, 16, 31, 63, 67
Buda, 12, 34
Bukovina, 13
Bulgarians, 6, 10, 66
Buxton, Mr. Noel, 68

CALVINISTS, 36
Campulung, 9
Carpathians, 10
Charles, K. of Roumania, 21, 30 sqq, 61
Closca, 37
Coalition, Hungarian, 51, 53
Cogalniceanu, 17, 18, 25, 71
Compromise, Austro-Hungarian, 42, 43
Constantinople, 69
Constitution, Roumanian, 27
Coutzo-Vlachs, 5, 9, 59, 60
Crimean War, 16, 17
Curtea de Arges, 9
Cuza, Alexander, 19, 20
Czechs, 6

DACIA, 8
Danube, 3, 8, 10, 23
Dardanelles, 70
Deák, 44
Debreczen, 54, 96
Dnjester, 10
Dobrugea, 24, 66
Dozsa, 37

EDUCATION ACTS, Hungarian, 52
Electoral Law, 45, 52
Entente, Triple, 1, 64
Eötvös, Baron, 44
Eugene, Prince, 10

FOREIGN POLICY, 33, 62–71
Francis Ferdinand, 49, 55
Francis Joseph, 33, 42
French influence, 16, 30

GEORGE V., King, 71
Ghika, Gregory, 13
Gortchakov, Prince, 25
Great Austrian party, 49
Greeks, 6, 13, 22, 60

HABSBURG, House of, 17
Hajdudorog, 54
Hermannstadt, 42, 46
Hohenzollern, 21, 63
Horia, 37
Hospodars, 13, 17
Hungary, 10, 30
Hunyady, 10

IRREDENTA, 6
Islam, 11
Italy, 62

JASSY, 9, 16
Jews in Roumania, 26
John Asen, 9
Jonescu, Mr. Take, 57, 71
Jorga, Professor, 4
Joseph, II., 11, 14, 37

KÁLLAY, Baron, 58
Karlsburg, 7
Khuen-Hedérváry, Count, 51, 53
Kišinev, 58
Klausenburg, 42, 49
Königgrätz, 41
Kossuth, Louis, 40

LEOPOLD I., 36
Liberal Party, 23, 30
Loudon, 14
Louis the Great, 10
Lueger, Dr., 32
Lukács, Dr., 53

MACEDONIA, 67
Macedo-Romans, 9
Magyarization, 44, 52
Magyars, 5, 23, 32, 37–54, 90
Maior, Peter, 39
Maria Theresa, 37
Matthias Corvinus, 10
Mazzini, 17
Memorandum Trial, 47
Michael the Brave, 12, 49
Micu, Ion Inocentiu, 37
——, Samuel, 39
Mihalyi, 51
Moldavia, 9, 31
Morning Post, 68

NAPOLEON, 14
—— III., 19, 20, 21
Nationalities, Law of, 44, 47

ORTHODOX CHURCH, 36, 42, 75–6
Osman Pasha, 24

PARIS, 16, 17
Party System, 29, 30
Phanariots, 12, 16
Pindus, 9
Plevna, 27
Poland, Partition of, 13
Pop, George, 51
Popovici, Aurel, 49
Population, 4
Pressburg, 40
Provisorium, 42

RATZIU, Dr. 48
Règlement Organique, 15
Rosetti, 17
Roumanian National Party, 47, 49
—— League, 49

SAGUNA, Archbishop, 42, 46
Salonica, 9
Saxons, 34, 97
Serbs, 2, 11, 22
Serbia, 5, 15, 76
Silistria, 24, 59
Sincai, 39
Sixtus, IV., 11
Slovaks, 6, 45, 50, 56
Sobieski, 10
Southern Slav Unity, 4, 34, 55
Stambul, 13
Stephen the Great, 10
Stere, Professor, 59
Suceava, 9, 13
Supplex Libellus, 38
Szekels, 34, 45, 91, 97

TARGOVISTEA, 9
Timok, 59
Tisza, Coloman, 51
——, Count Stephen, 51, 69
Toleration, Religious, 35
Trajan, 7
Transylvania, 3, 6, 33, 34, 56, 66, 72, 73
Triple Alliance, 61
Turkey, 3, 13, 15

UNIATE CHURCH, Roumanian, 36, 38, 54, 76

VAIDA, Dr., 51
Vienna, Congress of, 15
Vladimirescu, Tudor, 16

WALLACHIA, 10
White, Mr. (Sir W.), 23

XENOPOL, Professor, 20

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